Strongman, The

working with the Americans.” ’ 7
    (In fact, Putin was almost certainly aware that Saakashvili’s senior adviser was an American, Daniel Kunin, who previously worked for the National Democratic Institute and was paid not by the Georgian government but by the American, through the US Agency for International Development. Kunin was the first port of call for Washington officials trying to contact – and influence – the Georgian leader. 8 )
    Saakashvili says he proposed they should start from a clean sheet – that as a small country Georgia would do whatever it could to accommodate Russia’s interests, in exchange for some understanding of its own, much smaller interests. He says Putin seemed very receptive. ‘Actually I liked him. I cannot blame George Bush for looking into his soul because my first impression was that I liked him. I thought, well, yeah, he comes from this KGB kind of background, he is very different from what I come from and what I believe in, but this seems to be a pragmatic guy. He likes his own country, and maybe he would act on behalf of his county in a very pragmatic way and we can find some understanding. And you know, he was basically also trying to show, by the end of our conversation, that he could go a long way to solving some issues.’
    The good rapport led to regular telephone calls and genuine efforts on both sides to mend fences. But it was never going to be easy for Saakashvili to balance his desire for good relations with Moscow with his two major obsessions – restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia (ending the de facto independence of three provinces with close ties to Russia) and tethering his country to the West’s great alliances, NATO and the European Union.
    On 25 February 2004 Saakashvili made his first trip as president to the United States, and immediately raised the issue of Georgian membership of NATO. He announced a new five-year deal under which US army instructors would train thousands more Georgian troops.
    The honeymoon with Moscow lasted until May 2004, when Putin did what he called his ‘last favour’ for Saakashvili. The new Georgian government was close to civil war with the province of Ajaria – under its maverick Soviet-era leader, Aslan Abashidze. Saakashvili did what his predecessor Shevardnadze had done: he called Putin for help. And once again, Putin dispatched Igor Ivanov – now no longer foreign minister but secretary of the National Security Council – to the scene. Ivanov flew first to the Ajarian capital, Batumi, planning to negotiate with Abashidze and then fly on to Tbilisi. But as they had dinner that evening of 5 May, Ivanov recalls, news came of a Georgian armoured column heading for Batumi. Despite his call to the Georgian prime minister, requesting him to stop the advance, a fierce fire-fight soon broke out, right on the outskirts of the city. ‘It was so intensive we felt the smell of powder in the palace.’ According to Ivanov, Abashidze told him he had sufficient military power of his own to confront the Georgian troops and force them out of the region, but Ivanov replied: ‘I have a plane at the airport. If you are prepared to leave with me to Moscow, you are welcome to take this opportunity.’ Abashidze seized the chance of political asylum in Russia, and fled, taking his son, who was the mayor of Batumi, with him.
    Within hours Saakashvili’s troops entered the city, and Ajaria was reclaimed as part of Georgia. The next day, Saakashvili himself made a triumphant appearance in Batumi and addressed a jubilant crowd in the city square: ‘You are heroic people,’ he told them. ‘You have achieved your Georgia. We have shown the world we are a great people. Only we could have staged two bloodless revolutions in six months.’ Surrounded by jubilant supporters chanting ‘Misha! Misha!’, he walked to the Black Sea beach – out of bounds to Georgia’s leaders for many years – and splashed seawater on his face. And he uttered the promise, or threat, that the restoration of central control over Ajaria was only the start of his mission: ‘We must start negotiations, serious and peaceful negotiations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, about reuniting the country and settling problems which are not settled. We have proved in Ajaria that it is possible to act peacefully but resolutely. This means that Georgia will be strong and we will definitely get to Sukhumi [the capital of Abkhazia]. Exactly when? We shall