Strongman, The

see.’
    Aware of Moscow’s crucial role in defusing the crisis and getting rid of Abashidze, Saakashvili telephoned Putin to thank him. According to the Georgian, Putin gave a tart reply: ‘OK, Mikheil Mikheilovich, we helped you on this one, but remember very well, there will be no more free gifts offered to you, on South Ossetia and Abkhazia.’ Russia had much deeper interests in Georgia’s two breakaway territories than in Ajaria. Abkhazia is a republic of some 200,000 people (the figure is disputed) – less than half its pre-1992 population, since almost all the Georgians fled in the civil war. Its Black Sea coastal towns – Sukhumi, Gagra, Pitsunda – used to be principal holiday resorts for Russians during the Soviet period. South Ossetia is much smaller – less than 100,000 in Soviet days (roughly two-thirds Ossetian, and one-third Georgian), and only some 70,000 following the civil war of the early 1990s. The majority Ossetians had close links to their kinsfolk living in North Ossetia (a republic inside the Russian Federation). Both the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians looked to Russia for protection against the Georgians, and received large subsidies and other support. Since most of them did not have, and did not want to have, Georgian citizenship, Putin introduced a policy of ‘passportisation’ – issuing residents of the two provinces with Russian passports, which then allowed the Kremlin to claim the right to protect its citizens. In both republics ethnic Russians held important jobs, and in South Ossetia former KGB officers were brought in to staff key government posts.
    If Putin’s words about ‘no more favours’ were meant as a warning – and they certainly were – Saakashvili paid little heed. Perhaps he even misunderstood a hint that Putin is said to have given during their first meeting in the Kremlin, to the effect that he was prepared to do a deal over South Ossetia that would see it restored to Georgian sovereignty. In May, Giorgi Khaindrava, a film director whom Saakashvili appointed as his conflict resolution minister, saw maps hanging in the deputy security minister’s office showing plans for a military attack on South Ossetia. As he told the Caucasus expert Thomas de Waal, ‘All the days were mapped out – they wanted to do an exact copy of what they had done in Ajaria.’ 9 On 26 May 2004, Georgia’s Independence Day, Saakashvili held a huge military parade in Tbilisi at which he addressed the Abkhaz and South Ossetians in their own languages, urging reintegration with Georgia. The South Ossetian president, Eduard Kokoity, a onetime wrestler and businessman with strong links to Russia, recalled in an interview that Saakashvili’s call for reintegration sent an unambiguous message: ‘I want to emphasise that he did it in front of a column of tanks moving down Rustaveli Avenue. It was not a call but a threat for Ossetians. And everyone in Ossetia regarded this call as a threat.’ 10
    Five days later Saakashvili moved troops to the South Ossetian border to launch a massive ‘anti-smuggling’ operation. Ostensibly, the aim was to close down a huge market at the village of Ergneti, through which vast quantities of goods passed illegally between Russia, South Ossetia and Georgia. The Georgian attack caused the worst fighting in the region since 1992. Perhaps the real aim was to trigger the collapse of the South Ossetian government, but it had the opposite effect. Kokoity’s position was strengthened, and anti-Georgian attitudes hardened among ordinary South Ossetians, for whom the Ergneti market had provided their only source of income.
    With the Russian ministry of foreign affairs issuing a warning that ‘provocative steps’ might lead to ‘extremely negative consequences’, Saakashvili headed to Washington for help. But there too, his actions were seen as impulsive and dangerous. The secretary of state, Colin Powell, recalled: ‘I think the president over-reached too early. I had to make clear to him that, “You might think this is in your vital national interest – we’re not so sure it is. But it isn’t in our vital national interest. So don’t get yourself into a situation that may overwhelm you and think we are going to race in to rescue you from any difficulties you get into. So be careful.” ’
    Saakashvili took note, and in August Georgian troops were withdrawn.
    Election night
    Throughout history, Moscow has been afflicted by fires. The original