Strongman, The

invasion of Georgia in August 2008 destroyed at a stroke all the efforts made by Putin, and then Medvedev, to present their country as a truly post-Soviet, European, democratised and trustworthy power. The events leading up to the ‘five day war’, and the question of who bore ultimate responsibility for it, were surrounded with controversy – and obfuscated by a fierce PR war in which the Georgians proved considerably more adept than the Russians. In the following chapter I will attempt to shed some light on what happened – without claiming to provide definitive answers.

 
    10

THE DESCENT INTO WAR
    From Kosovo to Bucharest
    On Sunday 17 February 2008 Serbia’s breakaway Albanian-majority province of Kosovo declared itself independent. The next day the United States recognised it, and on Tuesday a reporter asked President Bush, ‘Isn’t this a poke in the eye to Vladimir Putin and others who say you’re approving of secession movements everywhere implicitly?’
    Bush replied: ‘Actually we’ve been working very closely with the Russians ... You know, there’s a disagreement, but we believe, as do many other nations, that history will prove this to be a correct move to bring peace to the Balkans.’
    It was not the Balkans that Putin was worried about. Russia had good reasons to oppose the recognition of Kosovo – and its ‘brotherly ties’ with Serbia were the very least of them. Pandora’s box was open. However forcefully the Americans and their allies insisted that the Kosovo case for independence was sui generis – a unique set of circumstances, setting no precedent – there were a number of other secessionist nations around the world who were delighted. If the Kosovars could vote for independence and secede from Serbia, against the ‘parent state’s’ wishes, citing military attacks, ethnic cleansing and acts of brutality committed against them, then could not the Chechens say the same about their position within Russia, or the Abkhaz and South Ossetians about theirs within Georgia?
    Above all, Russia did not want to encourage Chechen separatism, but it was also wary of encouraging the South Ossetians and Abkhaz to secede – precisely because of the precedent it could set for other tiny nations within the former Soviet Union, not least the chain of restive Muslim republics in Russia’s northern Caucasus region. At a summit meeting of leaders from the Commonwealth of Independent States – the loose grouping of former Soviet republics – President Putin delivered an unambiguous warning of the consequences: ‘The Kosovo precedent is a terrifying one,’ he said, shifting nervously in his seat and almost spitting out the words. ‘It in essence is breaking open the entire system of international relations that have prevailed not just for decades but for centuries. And it will without a doubt bring on itself an entire chain of unforeseen consequences.’
    Mikheil Saakashvili, re-elected as president of Georgia the previous month, was sitting in the audience, and gulped hard as he heard the Russian accuse Western governments of a grave miscalculation: ‘This is a stick with two ends, and that other end will come back and knock them on the head one day.’ In a separate meeting on the margins of the summit, Putin tried to reassure Saakashvili: ‘We’re not going to ape the Americans, and recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia just because Kosovo was recognised.’ But Saakashvili did not believe him, and in any case he was as aware as Putin was of the precedent set by Kosovo, and knew his own breakaway provinces might follow suit if he did not act quickly. His attempt to move against South Ossetia in 2004 had failed. Since then, with American help, he had transformed his military into a much more capable force. But if he was going to use it to retake Abkhazia and South Ossetia – risking confrontation with Russia – he would need much more than just logistical support from the Americans.
    Speaking nine days after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Saakashvili explained why Georgia was now keener than ever to join NATO. ‘Why do we need NATO membership?’ he asked. ‘We need it because Georgia should be strategically protected in this very difficult and risky region, and receive its share of security guarantees.’ A crucial NATO summit was approaching – in Bucharest in April – at which the alliance would consider whether to allow Georgia and Ukraine to