The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

universals and not of infimae species, so that as far
as this goes it would deal with the highest genera. These would
turn out to be being and unity; for these might most of all be
supposed to contain all things that are, and to be most like
principles because they are by nature; for if they perish all other
things are destroyed with them; for everything is and is one. But
inasmuch as, if one is to suppose them to be genera, they must be
predicable of their differentiae, and no genus is predicable of any
of its differentiae, in this way it would seem that we should not
make them genera nor principles. Further, if the simpler is more of
a principle than the less simple, and the ultimate members of the
genus are simpler than the genera (for they are indivisible, but
the genera are divided into many and differing species), the
species might seem to be the principles, rather than the genera.
But inasmuch as the species are involved in the destruction of the
genera, the genera are more like principles; for that which
involves another in its destruction is a principle of it. These and
others of the kind are the subjects that involve difficulties.
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    Further, must we suppose something apart from individual things,
or is it these that the science we are seeking treats of? But these
are infinite in number. Yet the things that are apart from the
individuals are genera or species; but the science we now seek
treats of neither of these. The reason why this is impossible has
been stated. Indeed, it is in general hard to say whether one must
assume that there is a separable substance besides the sensible
substances (i.e. the substances in this world), or that these are
the real things and Wisdom is concerned with them. For we seem to
seek another kind of substance, and this is our problem, i.e. to
see if there is something which can exist apart by itself and
belongs to no sensible thing.-Further, if there is another
substance apart from and corresponding to sensible substances,
which kinds of sensible substance must be supposed to have this
corresponding to them? Why should one suppose men or horses to have
it, more than either the other animals or even all lifeless things?
On the other hand to set up other and eternal substances equal in
number to the sensible and perishable substances would seem to fall
beyond the bounds of probability.-But if the principle we now seek
is not separable from corporeal things, what has a better claim to
the name matter? This, however, does not exist in actuality, but
exists in potency. And it would seem rather that the form or shape
is a more important principle than this; but the form is
perishable, so that there is no eternal substance at all which can
exist apart and independent. But this is paradoxical; for such a
principle and substance seems to exist and is sought by nearly all
the most refined thinkers as something that exists; for how is
there to be order unless there is something eternal and independent
and permanent?
    Further, if there is a substance or principle of such a nature
as that which we are now seeking, and if this is one for all
things, and the same for eternal and for perishable things, it is
hard to say why in the world, if there is the same principle, some
of the things that fall under the principle are eternal, and others
are not eternal; this is paradoxical. But if there is one principle
of perishable and another of eternal things, we shall be in a like
difficulty if the principle of perishable things, as well as that
of eternal, is eternal; for why, if the principle is eternal, are
not the things that fall under the principle also eternal? But if
it is perishable another principle is involved to account for it,
and another to account for that, and this will go on to
infinity.
    If on the other hand we are to set up what are thought to be the
most unchangeable principles, being and unity, firstly, if each of
these does not indicate a ‘this’ or substance, how will they be
separable and independent? Yet we expect the eternal and primary
principles to be so. But if each of them does signify a ‘this’ or
substance, all things that are are substances; for being is
predicated of all things (and unity also of some); but that all
things that are are substance is false. Further, how can they be
right who say that the first principle is unity and this is
substance, and generate number as the first product from unity and
from