The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

classified as substance, quality, place,
acting or being acted on, relation, quantity, there must be three
kinds of movement-of quality, of quantity, of place. There is no
movement in respect of substance (because there is nothing contrary
to substance), nor of relation (for it is possible that if one of
two things in relation changes, the relative term which was true of
the other thing ceases to be true, though this other does not
change at all,-so that their movement is accidental), nor of agent
and patient, or mover and moved, because there is no movement of
movement nor generation of generation, nor, in general, change of
change. For there might be movement of movement in two senses; (1)
movement might be the subject moved, as a man is moved because he
changes from pale to dark,-so that on this showing movement, too,
may be either heated or cooled or change its place or increase. But
this is impossible; for change is not a subject. Or (2) some other
subject might change from change into some other form of existence
(e.g. a man from disease into health). But this also is not
possible except incidentally. For every movement is change from
something into something. (And so are generation and destruction;
only, these are changes into things opposed in certain ways while
the other, movement, is into things opposed in another way.) A
thing changes, then, at the same time from health into illness, and
from this change itself into another. Clearly, then, if it has
become ill, it will have changed into whatever may be the other
change concerned (though it may be at rest), and, further, into a
determinate change each time; and that new change will be from
something definite into some other definite thing; therefore it
will be the opposite change, that of growing well. We answer that
this happens only incidentally; e.g. there is a change from the
process of recollection to that of forgetting, only because that to
which the process attaches is changing, now into a state of
knowledge, now into one of ignorance.
    Further, the process will go on to infinity, if there is to be
change of change and coming to be of coming to be. What is true of
the later, then, must be true of the earlier; e.g. if the simple
coming to be was once coming to be, that which comes to be
something was also once coming to be; therefore that which simply
comes to be something was not yet in existence, but something which
was coming to be coming to be something was already in existence.
And this was once coming to be, so that at that time it was not yet
coming to be something else. Now since of an infinite number of
terms there is not a first, the first in this series will not
exist, and therefore no following term exist. Nothing, then, can
either come term wi to be or move or change. Further, that which is
capable of a movement is also capable of the contrary movement and
rest, and that which comes to be also ceases to be. Therefore that
which is coming to be is ceasing to be when it has come to be
coming to be; for it cannot cease to be as soon as it is coming to
be coming to be, nor after it has come to be; for that which is
ceasing to be must be. Further, there must be a matter underlying
that which comes to be and changes. What will this be, then,-what
is it that becomes movement or becoming, as body or soul is that
which suffers alteration? And; again, what is it that they move
into? For it must be the movement or becoming of something from
something into something. How, then, can this condition be
fulfilled? There can be no learning of learning, and therefore no
becoming of becoming. Since there is not movement either of
substance or of relation or of activity and passivity, it remains
that movement is in respect of quality and quantity and place; for
each of these admits of contrariety. By quality I mean not that
which is in the substance (for even the differentia is a quality),
but the passive quality, in virtue of which a thing is said to be
acted on or to be incapable of being acted on. The immobile is
either that which is wholly incapable of being moved, or that which
is moved with difficulty in a long time or begins slowly, or that
which is of a nature to be moved and can be moved but is not moved
when and where and as it would naturally be moved. This alone among
immobiles I describe as being at rest; for rest is contrary to
movement, so that it must be a privation in that which is receptive
of movement.
    Things which are in one proximate