The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

place are together in place,
and things which are in different places are apart: things whose
extremes are together touch: that at which a changing thing, if it
changes continuously according to its nature, naturally arrives
before it arrives at the extreme into which it is changing, is
between. That which is most distant in a straight line is contrary
in place. That is successive which is after the beginning (the
order being determined by position or form or in some other way)
and has nothing of the same class between it and that which it
succeeds, e.g. lines in the case of a line, units in that of a
unit, or a house in that of a house. (There is nothing to prevent a
thing of some other class from being between.) For the successive
succeeds something and is something later; ‘one’ does not succeed
‘two’, nor the first day of the month the second. That which, being
successive, touches, is contiguous. (Since all change is between
opposites, and these are either contraries or contradictories, and
there is no middle term for contradictories, clearly that which is
between is between contraries.) The continuous is a species of the
contiguous. I call two things continuous when the limits of each,
with which they touch and by which they are kept together, become
one and the same, so that plainly the continuous is found in the
things out of which a unity naturally arises in virtue of their
contact. And plainly the successive is the first of these concepts
(for the successive does not necessarily touch, but that which
touches is successive; and if a thing is continuous, it touches,
but if it touches, it is not necessarily continuous; and in things
in which there is no touching, there is no organic unity);
therefore a point is not the same as a unit; for contact belongs to
points, but not to units, which have only succession; and there is
something between two of the former, but not between two of the
latter.

Book XII
    Translated by W. D. Ross
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1
    The subject of our inquiry is substance; for the principles and
the causes we are seeking are those of substances. For if the
universe is of the nature of a whole, substance is its first part;
and if it coheres merely by virtue of serial succession, on this
view also substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then
by quantity. At the same time these latter are not even being in
the full sense, but are qualities and movements of it,-or else even
the not-white and the not-straight would be being; at least we say
even these are, e.g. ‘there is a not-white’. Further, none of the
categories other than substance can exist apart. And the early
philosophers also in practice testify to the primacy of substance;
for it was of substance that they sought the principles and
elements and causes. The thinkers of the present day tend to rank
universals as substances (for genera are universals, and these they
tend to describe as principles and substances, owing to the
abstract nature of their inquiry); but the thinkers of old ranked
particular things as substances, e.g. fire and earth, not what is
common to both, body.
    There are three kinds of substance-one that is sensible (of
which one subdivision is eternal and another is perishable; the
latter is recognized by all men, and includes e.g. plants and
animals), of which we must grasp the elements, whether one or many;
and another that is immovable, and this certain thinkers assert to
be capable of existing apart, some dividing it into two, others
identifying the Forms and the objects of mathematics, and others
positing, of these two, only the objects of mathematics. The former
two kinds of substance are the subject of physics (for they imply
movement); but the third kind belongs to another science, if there
is no principle common to it and to the other kinds.
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2
    Sensible substance is changeable. Now if change proceeds from
opposites or from intermediates, and not from all opposites (for
the voice is not-white, (but it does not therefore change to
white)), but from the contrary, there must be something underlying
which changes into the contrary state; for the contraries do not
change. Further, something persists, but the contrary does not
persist; there is, then, some third thing besides the contraries,
viz. the matter. Now since changes are of four kinds-either in
respect of the ‘what’ or of the quality or of the quantity or