The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

said
about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a
false one the facts soon clash. Now goods have been divided into
three classes, and some are described as external, others as
relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most
properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we
class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at
least according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by
philosophers. It is correct also in that we identify the end with
certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of
the soul and not among external goods. Another belief which
harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and
does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of
good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for
in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have
defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with
virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of
philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied
by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also
external prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many
men and men of old, others by a few eminent persons; and it is not
probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but
rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or
even in most respects.
    With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue
our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity.
But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the
chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in
activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any
good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite
inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity
will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic
Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are
crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are
victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and
good things in life.
    Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state
of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is
pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses,
and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way
just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general
virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men their
pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by
nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the
things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such,
so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own
nature. Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a
sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For,
besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble
actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who
did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy
liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so,
virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also
good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest
degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his
judgement is such as we have described. Happiness then is the best,
noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes
are not severed as in the inscription at Delos
Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;
But pleasantest is it to win what we love.
    For all these properties belong to the best activities; and
these, or one—the best—of these, we identify with happiness.
    Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well;
for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the
proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and
political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack
of which takes the lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly
children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or
ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy,
and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly
bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by
death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of
prosperity