The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

discuss
thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an
uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by
friends of our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better,
indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even
to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are
philosophers or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety
requires us to honour truth above our friends.
    The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of
classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority
(which is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an
Idea embracing all numbers); but the term ‘good’ is used both in
the category of substance and in that of quality and in that of
relation, and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in
nature to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and
accident of being); so that there could not be a common Idea set
over all these goods. Further, since ‘good’ has as many senses as
‘being’ (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as
of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in
quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of
the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in
place, i.e. of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannot
be something universally present in all cases and single; for then
it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one
only. Further, since of the things answering to one Idea there is
one science, there would have been one science of all the goods;
but as it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall
under one category, e.g. of opportunity, for opportunity in war is
studied by strategics and in disease by medicine, and the moderate
in food is studied by medicine and in exercise by the science of
gymnastics. And one might ask the question, what in the world they
mean by ‘a thing itself’, is (as is the case) in ‘man himself’ and
in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in
so far as they are man, they will in no respect differ; and if this
is so, neither will ‘good itself’ and particular goods, in so far
as they are good. But again it will not be good any the more for
being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that
which perishes in a day. The Pythagoreans seem to give a more
plausible account of the good, when they place the one in the
column of goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have
followed.
    But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what
we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the
Platonists have not been speaking about all goods, and that the
goods that are pursued and loved for themselves are called good by
reference to a single Form, while those which tend to produce or to
preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so
by reference to these, and in a secondary sense. Clearly, then,
goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in
themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us separate, then,
things good in themselves from things useful, and consider whether
the former are called good by reference to a single Idea. What sort
of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are
pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence,
sight, and certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue
these also for the sake of something else, yet one would place them
among things good in themselves. Or is nothing other than the Idea
of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be empty. But if
the things we have named are also things good in themselves, the
account of the good will have to appear as something identical in
them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white
lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their
goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good,
therefore, is not some common element answering to one Idea.
    But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the
things that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then,
by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good,
or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the
body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. But
perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for
perfect precision about them would be