The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

more appropriate to another
branch of philosophy. And similarly with regard to the Idea; even
if there is some one good which is universally predicable of goods
or is capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it
could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking
something attainable. Perhaps, however, some one might think it
worth while to recognize this with a view to the goods that are
attainable and achievable; for having this as a sort of pattern we
shall know better the goods that are good for us, and if we know
them shall attain them. This argument has some plausibility, but
seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences; for all of
these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the
deficiency of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet
that all the exponents of the arts should be ignorant of, and
should not even seek, so great an aid is not probable. It is hard,
too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard
to his own craft by knowing this ‘good itself’, or how the man who
has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general
thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way,
but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular
man; it is individuals that he is healing. But enough of these
topics.
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7
    Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it
can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is
different in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise.
What then is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake
everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in strategy
victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something
else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the
sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if
there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good
achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will be
the goods achievable by action.
    So the argument has by a different course reached the same
point; but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there
are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g.
wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of
something else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief
good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one
final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more
than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now
we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than
that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and
that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more
final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for
the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without
qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never
for the sake of something else.
    Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for
this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something
else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose
indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should
still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of
happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy.
Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these,
nor, in general, for anything other than itself.
    From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems
to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now
by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a
man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for
parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow
citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit must be
set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and
descendants and friends’ friends we are in for an infinite series.
Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion; the
self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes
life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness
to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things,
without being counted as one good thing among others—if it were so
counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of
even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess
of