The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

virtue. But it
is possible to fear these more, or less, and again to fear things
that are not terrible as if they were. Of the faults that are
committed one consists in fearing what one should not, another in
fearing as we should not, another in fearing when we should not,
and so on; and so too with respect to the things that inspire
confidence. The man, then, who faces and who fears the right things
and from the right motive, in the right way and from the right
time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions,
is brave; for the brave man feels and acts according to the merits
of the case and in whatever way the rule directs. Now the end of
every activity is conformity to the corresponding state of
character. This is true, therefore, of the brave man as well as of
others. But courage is noble. Therefore the end also is noble; for
each thing is defined by its end. Therefore it is for a noble end
that the brave man endures and acts as courage directs.
    Of those who go to excess he who exceeds in fearlessness has no
name (we have said previously that many states of character have no
names), but he would be a sort of madman or insensible person if he
feared nothing, neither earthquakes nor the waves, as they say the
Celts do not; while the man who exceeds in confidence about what
really is terrible is rash. The rash man, however, is also thought
to be boastful and only a pretender to courage; at all events, as
the brave man is with regard to what is terrible, so the rash man
wishes to appear; and so he imitates him in situations where he
can. Hence also most of them are a mixture of rashness and
cowardice; for, while in these situations they display confidence,
they do not hold their ground against what is really terrible. The
man who exceeds in fear is a coward; for he fears both what he
ought not and as he ought not, and all the similar
characterizations attach to him. He is lacking also in confidence;
but he is more conspicuous for his excess of fear in painful
situations. The coward, then, is a despairing sort of person; for
he fears everything. The brave man, on the other hand, has the
opposite disposition; for confidence is the mark of a hopeful
disposition. The coward, the rash man, and the brave man, then, are
concerned with the same objects but are differently disposed
towards them; for the first two exceed and fall short, while the
third holds the middle, which is the right, position; and rash men
are precipitate, and wish for dangers beforehand but draw back when
they are in them, while brave men are keen in the moment of action,
but quiet beforehand.
    As we have said, then, courage is a mean with respect to things
that inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances that have
been stated; and it chooses or endures things because it is noble
to do so, or because it is base not to do so. But to die to escape
from poverty or love or anything painful is not the mark of a brave
man, but rather of a coward; for it is softness to fly from what is
troublesome, and such a man endures death not because it is noble
but to fly from evil.
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8
    Courage, then, is something of this sort, but the name is also
applied to five other kinds.
    First comes the courage of the citizen-soldier; for this is most
like true courage. Citizen-soldiers seem to face dangers because of
the penalties imposed by the laws and the reproaches they would
otherwise incur, and because of the honours they win by such
action; and therefore those peoples seem to be bravest among whom
cowards are held in dishonour and brave men in honour. This is the
kind of courage that Homer depicts, e.g. in Diomede and in
Hector:
First will Polydamas be to heap reproach on me then;
    and
For Hector one day ‘mid the Trojans shall utter his vaulting
harangue:
Afraid was Tydeides, and fled from my face.
    This kind of courage is most like to that which we described
earlier, because it is due to virtue; for it is due to shame and to
desire of a noble object (i.e. honour) and avoidance of disgrace,
which is ignoble. One might rank in the same class even those who
are compelled by their rulers; but they are inferior, inasmuch as
they do what they do not from shame but from fear, and to avoid not
what is disgraceful but what is painful; for their masters compel
them, as Hector does:
But if I shall spy any dastard that cowers far from the
fight,
Vainly will such an one hope to escape from the dogs.
    And those who give them