The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

since it is that which
has been decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the
object of choice. For every one ceases to inquire how he is to act
when he has brought the moving principle back to himself and to the
ruling part of himself; for this is what chooses. This is plain
also from the ancient constitutions, which Homer represented; for
the kings announced their choices to the people. The object of
choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired
after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in
our own power; for when we have decided as a result of
deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation.
    We may take it, then, that we have described choice in outline,
and stated the nature of its objects and the fact that it is
concerned with means.
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    That wish is for the end has already been stated; some think it
is for the good, others for the apparent good. Now those who say
that the good is the object of wish must admit in consequence that
that which the man who does not choose aright wishes for is not an
object of wish (for if it is to be so, it must also be good; but it
was, if it so happened, bad); while those who say the apparent good
is the object of wish must admit that there is no natural object of
wish, but only what seems good to each man. Now different things
appear good to different people, and, if it so happens, even
contrary things.
    If these consequences are unpleasing, are we to say that
absolutely and in truth the good is the object of wish, but for
each person the apparent good; that that which is in truth an
object of wish is an object of wish to the good man, while any
chance thing may be so the bad man, as in the case of bodies also
the things that are in truth wholesome are wholesome for bodies
which are in good condition, while for those that are diseased
other things are wholesome—or bitter or sweet or hot or heavy, and
so on; since the good man judges each class of things rightly, and
in each the truth appears to him? For each state of character has
its own ideas of the noble and the pleasant, and perhaps the good
man differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of
things, being as it were the norm and measure of them. In most
things the error seems to be due to pleasure; for it appears a good
when it is not. We therefore choose the pleasant as a good, and
avoid pain as an evil.
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    The end, then, being what we wish for, the means what we
deliberate about and choose, actions concerning means must be
according to choice and voluntary. Now the exercise of the virtues
is concerned with means. Therefore virtue also is in our own power,
and so too vice. For where it is in our power to act it is also in
our power not to act, and vice versa; so that, if to act, where
this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will be base,
will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble,
is in our power, to act, which will be base, will also be in our
power. Now if it is in our power to do noble or base acts, and
likewise in our power not to do them, and this was what being good
or bad meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous or
vicious.
    The saying that ‘no one is voluntarily wicked nor involuntarily
happy’ seems to be partly false and partly true; for no one is
involuntarily happy, but wickedness is voluntary. Or else we shall
have to dispute what has just been said, at any rate, and deny that
man is a moving principle or begetter of his actions as of
children. But if these facts are evident and we cannot refer
actions to moving principles other than those in ourselves, the
acts whose moving principles are in us must themselves also be in
our power and voluntary.
    Witness seems to be borne to this both by individuals in their
private capacity and by legislators themselves; for these punish
and take vengeance on those who do wicked acts (unless they have
acted under compulsion or as a result of ignorance for which they
are not themselves responsible), while they honour those who do
noble acts, as though they meant to encourage the latter and deter
the former. But no one is encouraged to do the things that are
neither in our power nor voluntary; it is assumed that there is no
gain in being persuaded not to be hot or in pain or hungry or the
like, since we shall experience these feelings none the less.
Indeed, we punish a man for his very ignorance,