The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

always painful, and the same
thing always pleasant, and not one thing at one time and another at
another; he has, so to speak, nothing to repent of.
    Therefore, since each of these characteristics belongs to the
good man in relation to himself, and he is related to his friend as
to himself (for his friend is another self), friendship too is
thought to be one of these attributes, and those who have these
attributes to be friends. Whether there is or is not friendship
between a man and himself is a question we may dismiss for the
present; there would seem to be friendship in so far as he is two
or more, to judge from the afore-mentioned attributes of
friendship, and from the fact that the extreme of friendship is
likened to one’s love for oneself.
    But the attributes named seem to belong even to the majority of
men, poor creatures though they may be. Are we to say then that in
so far as they are satisfied with themselves and think they are
good, they share in these attributes? Certainly no one who is
thoroughly bad and impious has these attributes, or even seems to
do so. They hardly belong even to inferior people; for they are at
variance with themselves, and have appetites for some things and
rational desires for others. This is true, for instance, of
incontinent people; for they choose, instead of the things they
themselves think good, things that are pleasant but hurtful; while
others again, through cowardice and laziness, shrink from doing
what they think best for themselves. And those who have done many
terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness even shrink from
life and destroy themselves. And wicked men seek for people with
whom to spend their days, and shun themselves; for they remember
many a grevious deed, and anticipate others like them, when they
are by themselves, but when they are with others they forget. And
having nothing lovable in them they have no feeling of love to
themselves. Therefore also such men do not rejoice or grieve with
themselves; for their soul is rent by faction, and one element in
it by reason of its wickedness grieves when it abstains from
certain acts, while the other part is pleased, and one draws them
this way and the other that, as if they were pulling them in
pieces. If a man cannot at the same time be pained and pleased, at
all events after a short time he is pained because he was pleased,
and he could have wished that these things had not been pleasant to
him; for bad men are laden with repentance.
    Therefore the bad man does not seem to be amicably disposed even
to himself, because there is nothing in him to love; so that if to
be thus is the height of wretchedness, we should strain every nerve
to avoid wickedness and should endeavour to be good; for so and
only so can one be either friendly to oneself or a friend to
another.
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5
    Goodwill is a friendly sort of relation, but is not identical
with friendship; for one may have goodwill both towards people whom
one does not know, and without their knowing it, but not
friendship. This has indeed been said already.’ But goodwill is not
even friendly feeling. For it does not involve intensity or desire,
whereas these accompany friendly feeling; and friendly feeling
implies intimacy while goodwill may arise of a sudden, as it does
towards competitors in a contest; we come to feel goodwill for them
and to share in their wishes, but we would not do anything with
them; for, as we said, we feel goodwill suddenly and love them only
superficially.
    Goodwill seems, then, to be a beginning of friendship, as the
pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love. For no one loves if
he has not first been delighted by the form of the beloved, but he
who delights in the form of another does not, for all that, love
him, but only does so when he also longs for him when absent and
craves for his presence; so too it is not possible for people to be
friends if they have not come to feel goodwill for each other, but
those who feel goodwill are not for all that friends; for they only
wish well to those for whom they feel goodwill, and would not do
anything with them nor take trouble for them. And so one might by
an extension of the term friendship say that goodwill is inactive
friendship, though when it is prolonged and reaches the point of
intimacy it becomes friendship-not the friendship based on utility
nor that based on pleasure; for goodwill too does not arise on
those terms. The man who has received a