The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

he was being loved for his character, when the other
person was doing nothing of the kind, he must blame himself; when
he has been deceived by the pretences of the other person, it is
just that he should complain against his deceiver; he will complain
with more justice than one does against people who counterfeit the
currency, inasmuch as the wrongdoing is concerned with something
more valuable.
    But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly
and is seen to do so, must one still love him? Surely it is
impossible, since not everything can be loved, but only what is
good. What is evil neither can nor should be loved; for it is not
one’s duty to be a lover of evil, nor to become like what is bad;
and we have said that like is dear like. Must the friendship, then,
be forthwith broken off? Or is this not so in all cases, but only
when one’s friends are incurable in their wickedness? If they are
capable of being reformed one should rather come to the assistance
of their character or their property, inasmuch as this is better
and more characteristic of friendship. But a man who breaks off
such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange; for it
was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend
has changed, therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him
up.
    But if one friend remained the same while the other became
better and far outstripped him in virtue, should the latter treat
the former as a friend? Surely he cannot. When the interval is
great this becomes most plain, e.g. in the case of childish
friendships; if one friend remained a child in intellect while the
other became a fully developed man, how could they be friends when
they neither approved of the same things nor delighted in and were
pained by the same things? For not even with regard to each other
will their tastes agree, and without this (as we saw) they cannot
be friends; for they cannot live together. But we have discussed
these matters.
    Should he, then, behave no otherwise towards him than he would
if he had never been his friend? Surely he should keep a
remembrance of their former intimacy, and as we think we ought to
oblige friends rather than strangers, so to those who have been our
friends we ought to make some allowance for our former friendship,
when the breach has not been due to excess of wickedness.
<
    div class="section" title="4">
4
    Friendly relations with one’s neighbours, and the marks by which
friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man’s
relations to himself. For (1) we define a friend as one who wishes
and does what is good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend, or
(2) as one who wishes his friend to exist and live, for his sake;
which mothers do to their children, and friends do who have come
into conflict. And (3) others define him as one who lives with and
(4) has the same tastes as another, or (5) one who grieves and
rejoices with his friend; and this too is found in mothers most of
all. It is by some one of these characterstics that friendship too
is defined.
    Now each of these is true of the good man’s relation to himself
(and of all other men in so far as they think themselves good;
virtue and the good man seem, as has been said, to be the measure
of every class of things). For his opinions are harmonious, and he
desires the same things with all his soul; and therefore he wishes
for himself what is good and what seems so, and does it (for it is
characteristic of the good man to work out the good), and does so
for his own sake (for he does it for the sake of the intellectual
element in him, which is thought to be the man himself); and he
wishes himself to live and be preserved, and especially the element
by virtue of which he thinks. For existence is good to the virtuous
man, and each man wishes himself what is good, while no one chooses
to possess the whole world if he has first to become some one else
(for that matter, even now God possesses the good); he wishes for
this only on condition of being whatever he is; and the element
that thinks would seem to be the individual man, or to be so more
than any other element in him. And such a man wishes to live with
himself; for he does so with pleasure, since the memories of his
past acts are delightful and his hopes for the future are good, and
therefore pleasant. His mind is well stored too with subjects of
contemplation. And he grieves and rejoices, more than any other,
with himself; for the same thing is