The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

Wherefore the
poets say,
It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;
    as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by
nature one.
    Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and
slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right
when he says,
First house and wife and an ox for the plough,
    for the ox is the poor man’s slave. The family is the
association established by nature for the supply of men’s everyday
wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas ‘companions of
the cupboard,’ and by Epimenides the Cretan, ‘companions of the
manger.’ But when several families are united, and the association
aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first
society to be formed is the village. And the most natural form of
the village appears to be that of a colony from the family,
composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be
suckled ‘with the same milk.’ And this is the reason why Hellenic
states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were
under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still
are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the
colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed
because they were of the same blood. As Homer says:
Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.
    For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times.
Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, because they
themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a
king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their
ways of life to be like their own.
    When several villages are united in a single complete community,
large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes
into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and
continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore,
if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for
it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For
what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature,
whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides,
the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be
self-sufficing is the end and the best.
    Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and
that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and
not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or
above humanity; he is like the
Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,
    whom Homer denounces—the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of
war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts.
    Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any
other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes
nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed
with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an
indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other
animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and
pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further),
the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and
inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it
is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and
evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of
living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
    Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and
to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the
part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no
foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a
stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than
that. But things are defined by their working and power; and we
ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have
their proper quality, but only that they have the same name. The
proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the
individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not
self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the
whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need
because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a
god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in
all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the
greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of
animals, but, when