The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

should be supreme; and that the magistrate or
magistrates should regulate those matters only on which the laws
are unable to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any
general principle embracing all particulars. But what are good laws
has not yet been clearly explained; the old difficulty remains. The
goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of laws varies of
necessity with the constitutions of states. This, however, is
clear, that the laws must be adapted to the constitutions. But if
so, true forms of government will of necessity have just laws, and
perverted forms of government will have unjust laws.
XII
    In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest
good and in the highest degree a good in the most authoritative of
all—this is the political science of which the good is justice, in
other words, the common interest. All men think justice to be a
sort of equality; and to a certain extent they agree in the
philosophical distinctions which have been laid down by us about
Ethics. For they admit that justice is a thing and has a relation
to persons, and that equals ought to have equality. But there still
remains a question: equality or inequality of what? Here is a
difficulty which calls for political speculation. For very likely
some persons will say that offices of state ought to be unequally
distributed according to superior excellence, in whatever respect,
of the citizen, although there is no other difference between him
and the rest of the community; for that those who differ in any one
respect have different rights and claims. But, surely, if this is
true, the complexion or height of a man, or any other advantage,
will be a reason for his obtaining a greater share of political
rights. The error here lies upon the surface, and may be
illustrated from the other arts and sciences. When a number of
flute players are equal in their art, there is no reason why those
of them who are better born should have better flutes given to
them; for they will not play any better on the flute, and the
superior instrument should be reserved for him who is the superior
artist. If what I am saying is still obscure, it will be made
clearer as we proceed. For if there were a superior flute-player
who was far inferior in birth and beauty, although either of these
may be a greater good than the art of flute-playing, and may excel
flute-playing in a greater ratio than he excels the others in his
art, still he ought to have the best flutes given to him, unless
the advantages of wealth and birth contribute to excellence in
flute-playing, which they do not. Moreover, upon this principle any
good may be compared with any other. For if a given height may be
measured wealth and against freedom, height in general may be so
measured. Thus if A excels in height more than B in virtue, even if
virtue in general excels height still more, all goods will be
commensurable; for if a certain amount is better than some other,
it is clear that some other will be equal. But since no such
comparison can be made, it is evident that there is good reason why
in politics men do not ground their claim to office on every sort
of inequality any more than in the arts. For if some be slow, and
others swift, that is no reason why the one should have little and
the others much; it is in gymnastics contests that such excellence
is rewarded. Whereas the rival claims of candidates for office can
only be based on the possession of elements which enter into the
composition of a state. And therefore the noble, or free-born, or
rich, may with good reason claim office; for holders of offices
must be freemen and taxpayers: a state can be no more composed
entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. But if wealth and
freedom are necessary elements, justice and valor are equally so;
for without the former qualities a state cannot exist at all,
without the latter not well.
XIII
    If the existence of the state is alone to be considered, then it
would seem that all, or some at least, of these claims are just;
but, if we take into account a good life, then, as I have already
said, education and virtue have superior claims. As, however, those
who are equal in one thing ought not to have an equal share in all,
nor those who are unequal in one thing to have an unequal share in
all, it is certain that all forms of government which rest on
either of these principles are perversions. All men have a claim in
a certain sense, as I have already admitted, but all have