The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

created by
friendship, for the will to live together is friendship. The end of
the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it. And
the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and
self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable
life.
    Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the
sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. Hence they
who contribute most to such a society have a greater share in it
than those who have the same or a greater freedom or nobility of
birth but are inferior to them in political virtue; or than those
who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.
    From what has been said it will be clearly seen that all the
partisans of different forms of government speak of a part of
justice only.
X
    There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in
the state: Is it the multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the
one best man? Or a tyrant? Any of these alternatives seems to
involve disagreeable consequences. If the poor, for example,
because they are more in number, divide among themselves the
property of the rich—is not this unjust? No, by heaven (will be the
reply), for the supreme authority justly willed it. But if this is
not injustice, pray what is? Again, when in the first division all
has been taken, and the majority divide anew the property of the
minority, is it not evident, if this goes on, that they will ruin
the state? Yet surely, virtue is not the ruin of those who possess
her, nor is justice destructive of a state; and therefore this law
of confiscation clearly cannot be just. If it were, all the acts of
a tyrant must of necessity be just; for he only coerces other men
by superior power, just as the multitude coerce the rich. But is it
just then that the few and the wealthy should be the rulers? And
what if they, in like manner, rob and plunder the people—is this
just? if so, the other case will likewise be just. But there can be
no doubt that all these things are wrong and unjust.
    Then ought the good to rule and have supreme power? But in that
case everybody else, being excluded from power, will be dishonored.
For the offices of a state are posts of honor; and if one set of
men always holds them, the rest must be deprived of them. Then will
it be well that the one best man should rule? Nay, that is still
more oligarchical, for the number of those who are dishonored is
thereby increased. Some one may say that it is bad in any case for
a man, subject as he is to all the accidents of human passion, to
have the supreme power, rather than the law. But what if the law
itself be democratical or oligarchical, how will that help us out
of our difficulties? Not at all; the same consequences will
follow.
XI
    Most of these questions may be reserved for another occasion.
The principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than
the few best is one that is maintained, and, though not free from
difficulty, yet seems to contain an element of truth. For the many,
of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet
together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded
not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many
contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse.
For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and
prudence, and when they meet together, they become in a manner one
man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses; that is a figure of
their mind and disposition. Hence the many are better judges than a
single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and
some another, and among them they understand the whole. There is a
similar combination of qualities in good men, who differ from any
individual of the many, as the beautiful are said to differ from
those who are not beautiful, and works of art from realities,
because in them the scattered elements are combined, although, if
taken separately, the eye of one person or some other feature in
another person would be fairer than in the picture. Whether this
principle can apply to every democracy, and to all bodies of men,
is not clear. Or rather, by heaven, in some cases it is impossible
of application; for the argument would equally hold about brutes;
and wherein, it will be asked, do some men differ from brutes? But
there may be bodies of men about whom our statement is nevertheless
true. And if so, the difficulty which has been already raised, and
also