The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

another which is akin to it —viz., what power should be
assigned to the mass of freemen and citizens, who are not rich and
have no personal merit—are both solved. There is still a danger in
aflowing them to share the great offices of state, for their folly
will lead them into error, and their dishonesty into crime. But
there is a danger also in not letting them share, for a state in
which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be
full of enemies. The only way of escape is to assign to them some
deliberative and judicial functions. For this reason Solon and
certain other legislators give them the power of electing to
offices, and of calling the magistrates to account, but they do not
allow them to hold office singly. When they meet together their
perceptions are quite good enough, and combined with the better
class they are useful to the state (just as impure food when mixed
with what is pure sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome
than a small quantity of the pure would be), but each individual,
left to himself, forms an imperfect judgment. On the other hand,
the popular form of government involves certain difficulties. In
the first place, it might be objected that he who can judge of the
healing of a sick man would be one who could himself heal his
disease, and make him whole—that is, in other words, the physician;
and so in all professions and arts. As, then, the physician ought
to be called to account by physicians, so ought men in general to
be called to account by their peers. But physicians are of three
kinds: there is the ordinary practitioner, and there is the
physician of the higher class, and thirdly the intelligent man who
has studied the art: in all arts there is such a class; and we
attribute the power of judging to them quite as much as to
professors of the art. Secondly, does not the same principle apply
to elections? For a right election can only be made by those who
have knowledge; those who know geometry, for example, will choose a
geometrician rightly, and those who know how to steer, a pilot;
and, even if there be some occupations and arts in which private
persons share in the ability to choose, they certainly cannot
choose better than those who know. So that, according to this
argument, neither the election of magistrates, nor the calling of
them to account, should be entrusted to the many. Yet possibly
these objections are to a great extent met by our old answer, that
if the people are not utterly degraded, although individually they
may be worse judges than those who have special knowledge—as a body
they are as good or better. Moreover, there are some arts whose
products are not judged of solely, or best, by the artists
themselves, namely those arts whose products are recognized even by
those who do not possess the art; for example, the knowledge of the
house is not limited to the builder only; the user, or, in other
words, the master, of the house will be even a better judge than
the builder, just as the pilot will judge better of a rudder than
the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a feast than the
cook.
    This difficulty seems now to be sufficiently answered, but there
is another akin to it. That inferior persons should have authority
in greater matters than the good would appear to be a strange
thing, yet the election and calling to account of the magistrates
is the greatest of all. And these, as I was saying, are functions
which in some states are assigned to the people, for the assembly
is supreme in all such matters. Yet persons of any age, and having
but a small property qualification, sit in the assembly and
deliberate and judge, although for the great officers of state,
such as treasurers and generals, a high qualification is required.
This difficulty may be solved in the same manner as the preceding,
and the present practice of democracies may be really defensible.
For the power does not reside in the dicast, or senator, or
ecclesiast, but in the court, and the senate, and the assembly, of
which individual senators, or ecclesiasts, or dicasts, are only
parts or members. And for this reason the many may claim to have a
higher authority than the few; for the people, and the senate, and
the courts consist of many persons, and their property collectively
is greater than the property of one or of a few individuals holding
great offices. But enough of this.
    The discussion of the first question shows nothing so clearly as
that laws, when good,