The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

appointed, some
by vote, and some by lot. These then are the four modes of
appointing judges from the whole people, and there will be likewise
four modes, if they are elected from a part only; for they may be
appointed from some by vote and judge in all causes; or they may be
appointed from some by lot and judge in all causes; or they may be
elected in some cases by vote, and in some cases taken by lot, or
some courts, even when judging the same causes, may be composed of
members some appointed by vote and some by lot. These modes, then,
as was said, answer to those previously mentioned.
    Once more, the modes of appointment may be combined; I mean,
that some may be chosen out of the whole people, others out of
some, some out of both; for example, the same tribunal may be
composed of some who were elected out of all, and of others who
were elected out of some, either by vote or by lot or by both.
    In how many forms law-courts can be established has now been
considered. The first form, viz., that in which the judges are
taken from all the citizens, and in which all causes are tried, is
democratical; the second, which is composed of a few only who try
all causes, oligarchical; the third, in which some courts are taken
from all classes, and some from certain classes only,
aristocratical and constitutional.

Politics, Book V
    Translated by Benjamin Jowett
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I
    The design which we proposed to ourselves is now nearly
completed. Next in order follow the causes of revolution in states,
how many, and of what nature they are; what modes of destruction
apply to particular states, and out of what, and into what they
mostly change; also what are the modes of preservation in states
generally, or in a particular state, and by what means each state
may be best preserved: these questions remain to be considered.
    In the first place we must assume as our starting-point that in
the many forms of government which have sprung up there has always
been an acknowledgment of justice and proportionate equality,
although mankind fail attaining them, as I have already explained.
Democracy, for example, arises out of the notion that those who are
equal in any respect are equal in all respects; because men are
equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based
on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all
respects unequal; being unequal, that is, in property, they suppose
themselves to be unequal absolutely. The democrats think that as
they are equal they ought to be equal in all things; while the
oligarchs, under the idea that they are unequal, claim too much,
which is one form of inequality. All these forms of government have
a kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are
faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the
government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up
revolution. Those who excel in virtue have the best right of all to
rebel (for they alone can with reason be deemed absolutely
unequal), but then they are of all men the least inclined to do so.
There is also a superiority which is claimed by men of rank; for
they are thought noble because they spring from wealthy and
virtuous ancestors. Here then, so to speak, are opened the very
springs and fountains of revolution; and hence arise two sorts of
changes in governments; the one affecting the constitution, when
men seek to change from an existing form into some other, for
example, from democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into
democracy, or from either of them into constitutional government or
aristocracy, and conversely; the other not affecting the
constitution, when, without disturbing the form of government,
whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any other, they try to get the
administration into their own hands. Further, there is a question
of degree; an oligarchy, for example, may become more or less
oligarchical, and a democracy more or less democratical; and in
like manner the characteristics of the other forms of government
may be more or less strictly maintained. Or the revolution may be
directed against a portion of the constitution only, e.g., the
establishment or overthrow of a particular office: as at Sparta it
is said that Lysander attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and King
Pausanias, the Ephoralty. At Epidamnus, too, the change was
partial. For instead of phylarchs or heads of tribes, a council was
appointed; but to this day the magistrates are