The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

tribes, and wards, and phratries, until all the
citizens have been gone through; or the citizens may be in all
cases eligible indiscriminately); or again (A 1 c, A 2 c) to some
offices in the one way, to some in the other. Again, if it is only
some that appoint, they may do so either (B 1 a) from all by vote,
or (B 1 b) from all by lot, or (B 2 a) from some by vote, or (B 2
b) from some by lot, or to some offices in the one way, to others
in the other, i.e., (B 1 c) from all, to some offices by vote, to
some by lot, and (B 2 C) from some, to some offices by vote, to
some by lot. Thus the modes that arise, apart from two (C, 3) out
of the three couplings, number twelve. Of these systems two are
popular, that all should appoint from all (A 1 a) by vote or (A 1
b) by lot—or (A 1 c) by both. That all should not appoint at once,
but should appoint from all or from some either by lot or by vote
or by both, or appoint to some offices from all and to others from
some (’by both’ meaning to some offices by lot, to others by vote),
is characteristic of a polity. And (B 1 c) that some should appoint
from all, to some offices by vote, to others by lot, is also
characteristic of a polity, but more oligarchical than the former
method. And (A 3 a, b, c, B 3 a, b, c) to appoint from both, to
some offices from all, to others from some, is characteristic of a
polity with a leaning towards aristocracy. That (B 2) some should
appoint from some is oligarchical—even (B 2 b) that some should
appoint from some by lot (and if this does not actually occur, it
is none the less oligarchical in character), or (B 2 C) that some
should appoint from some by both. (B 1 a) that some should appoint
from all, and (A 2 a) that all should appoint from some, by vote,
is aristocratic.
    These are the different modes of constituting magistrates, and
these correspond to different forms of government: which are proper
to which, or how they ought to be established, will be evident when
we determine the nature of their powers. By powers I mean such
powers as a magistrate exercises over the revenue or in defense of
the country; for there are various kinds of power: the power of the
general, for example, is not the same with that which regulates
contracts in the market.
XVI
    Of the three parts of government, the judicial remains to be
considered, and this we shall divide on the same principle. There
are three points on which the variedes of law-courts depend: The
persons from whom they are appointed, the matters with which they
are concerned, and the manner of their appointment. I mean, (1) are
the judges taken from all, or from some only? (2) how many kinds of
law-courts are there? (3) are the judges chosen by vote or by
lot?
    First, let me determine how many kinds of law-courts there are.
There are eight in number: One is the court of audits or
scrutinies; a second takes cognizance of ordinary offenses against
the state; a third is concerned with treason against the
constitution; the fourth determines disputes respecting penalties,
whether raised by magistrates or by private persons; the fifth
decides the more important civil cases; the sixth tries cases of
homicide, which are of various kinds, (a) premeditated, (b)
involuntary, (c) cases in which the guilt is confessed but the
justice is disputed; and there may be a fourth court (d) in which
murderers who have fled from justice are tried after their return;
such as the Court of Phreatto is said to be at Athens. But cases of
this sort rarely happen at all even in large cities. The different
kinds of homicide may be tried either by the same or by different
courts. (7) There are courts for strangers: of these there are two
subdivisions, (a) for the settlement of their disputes with one
another, (b) for the settlement of disputes between them and the
citizens. And besides all these there must be (8) courts for small
suits about sums of a drachma up to five drachmas, or a little
more, which have to be determined, but they do not require many
judges.
    Nothing more need be said of these small suits, nor of the
courts for homicide and for strangers: I would rather speak of
political cases, which, when mismanaged, create division and
disturbances in constitutions.
    Now if all the citizens judge, in all the different cases which
I have distinguished, they may be appointed by vote or by lot, or
sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote. Or when a single class of
causes are tried, the judges who decide them may be