The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

whereas in deinocracies the poor are
paid to attend. And this practice of oligarchies should be adopted
by democracies in their public assemblies, for they will advise
better if they all deliberate together—the people with the notables
and the notables with the people. It is also a good plan that those
who deliberate should be elected by vote or by lot in equal numbers
out of the different classes; and that if the people greatly exceed
in number those who have political training, pay should not be
given to all, but only to as many as would balance the number of
the notables, or that the number in excess should be eliminated by
lot. But in oligarchies either certain persons should be co-opted
from the mass, or a class of officers should be appointed such as
exist in some states who are termed probuli and guardians of the
law; and the citizens should occupy themselves exclusively with
matters on which these have previously deliberated; for so the
people will have a share in the deliberations of the state, but
will not be able to disturb the principles of the constitution.
Again, in oligarchies either the people ought to accept the
measures of the government, or not to pass anything contrary to
them; or, if all are allowed to share in counsel, the decision
should rest with the magistrates. The opposite of what is done in
constitutional governments should be the rule in oligarchies; the
veto of the majority should be final, their assent not final, but
the proposal should be referred back to the magistrates. Whereas in
constitutional governments they take the contrary course; the few
have the negative, not the affirmative power; the affirmation of
everything rests with the multitude.
    These, then, are our conclusions respecting the deliberative,
that is, the supreme element in states.
XV
    Next we will proceed to consider the distribution of offices;
this too, being a part of politics concerning which many questions
arise: What shall their number be? Over what shall they preside,
and what shall be their duration? Sometimes they last for six
months, sometimes for less; sometimes they are annual, while in
other cases offices are held for still longer periods. Shall they
be for life or for a long term of years; or, if for a short term
only, shall the same persons hold them over and over again, or once
only? Also about the appointment to them—from whom are they to be
chosen, by whom, and how? We should first be in a position to say
what are the possible varieties of them, and then we may proceed to
determine which are suited to different forms of government. But
what are to be included under the term ‘offices’? That is a
question not quite so easily answered. For a political community
requires many officers; and not every one who is chosen by vote or
by lot is to be regarded as a ruler. In the first place there are
the priests, who must be distinguished from political officers;
masters of choruses and heralds, even ambassadors, are elected by
vote. Some duties of superintendence again are political, extending
either to all the citizens in a single sphere of action, like the
office of the general who superintends them when they are in the
field, or to a section of them only, like the inspectorships of
women or of youth. Other offices are concerned with household
management, like that of the corn measurers who exist in many
states and are elected officers. There are also menial offices
which the rich have executed by their slaves. Speaking generally,
those are to be called offices to which the duties are assigned of
deliberating about certain measures and ofjudging and commanding,
especially the last; for to command is the especial duty of a
magistrate. But the question is not of any importance in practice;
no one has ever brought into court the meaning of the word,
although such problems have a speculative interest.
    What kinds of offices, and how many, are necessary to the
existence of a state, and which, if not necessary, yet conduce to
its well being are much more important considerations, affecting
all constitutions, but more especially small states. For in great
states it is possible, and indeed necessary, that every office
should have a special function; where the citizens are numerous,
many may hold office. And so it happens that some offices a man
holds a second time only after a long interval, and others he holds
once only; and certainly every work is better done which receives
the sole, and not the divided