The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

overthrow the state.
    Governments also change into oligarchy or into democracy or into
a constitutional government because the magistrates, or some other
section of the state, increase in power or renown. Thus at Athens
the reputation gained by the court of the Areopagus, in the Persian
War, seemed to tighten the reins of government. On the other hand,
the victory of Salamis, which was gained by the common people who
served in the fleet, and won for the Athenians the empire due to
command of the sea, strengthened the democracy. At Argos, the
notables, having distinguished themselves against the
Lacedaemonians in the battle of Mantinea, attempted to put down the
democracy. At Syracuse, the people, having been the chief authors
of the victory in the war with the Athenians, changed the
constitutional government into democracy. At Chalcis, the people,
uniting with the notables, killed Phoxus the tyrant, and then
seized the government. At Ambracia, the people, in like manner,
having joined with the conspirators in expelling the tyrant
Periander, transferred the government to themselves. And generally
it should be remembered that those who have secured power to the
state, whether private citizens, or magistrates, or tribes, or any
other part or section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions.
For either envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or
they themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to
remain on a level with others.
    Revolutions also break out when opposite parties, e.g., the rich
and the people, are equally balanced, and there is little or no
middle class; for, if either party were manifestly superior, the
other would not risk an attack upon them. And, for this reason,
those who are eminent in virtue usually do not stir up
insurrections, always being a minority. Such are the beginnings and
causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every form of
government is liable.
    Revolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by fraud.
Force may be applied either at the time of making the revolution or
afterwards. Fraud, again, is of two kinds; for (1) sometimes the
citizens are deceived into acquiescing in a change of government,
and afterwards they are held in subjection against their will. This
was what happened in the case of the Four Hundred, who deceived the
people by telling them that the king would provide money for the
war against the Lacedaemonians, and, having cheated the people,
still endeavored to retain the government. (2) In other cases the
people are persuaded at first, and afterwards, by a repetition of
the persuasion, their goodwill and allegiance are retained. The
revolutions which effect constitutions generally spring from the
above-mentioned causes.
V
    And now, taking each constitution separately, we must see what
follows from the principles already laid down.
    Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the
intemperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity
lay information against rich men until they compel them to combine
(for a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies), or coming
forward in public stir up the people against them. The truth of
this remark is proved by a variety of examples. At Cos the
democracy was overthrown because wicked demagogues arose, and the
notables combined. At Rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay
for the multitude, but prevented them from making good to the
trierarchs the sums which had been expended by them; and they, in
consequence of the suits which were brought against them, were
compelled to combine and put down the democracy. The democracy at
Heraclea was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the colony
by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the notables,
who came back in a body and put an end to the democracy. Much in
the same manner the democracy at Megara was overturned; there the
demagogues drove out many of the notables in order that they might
be able to confiscate their property. At length the exiles,
becoming numerous, returned, and, engaging and defeating the
people, established the oligarchy. The same thing happened with the
democracy of Cyme, which was overthrown by Thrasymachus. And we may
observe that in most states the changes have been of this
character. For sometimes the demagogues, in order to curry favor
with the people, wrong the notables and so force them to combine;
either they make a division of their property, or diminish their
incomes by the