The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

quarrels of the notables, and to
prevent those who have not hitherto taken part in them from
catching the spirit of contention. No ordinary man can discern the
beginning of evil, but only the true statesman.
    As to the change produced in oligarchies and constitutional
governments by the alteration of the qualification, when this
arises, not out of any variation in the qualification but only out
of the increase of money, it is well to compare the general
valuation of property with that of past years, annually in those
cities in which the census is taken annually and in larger cities
every third or fifth year. If the whole is many times greater or
many times less than when the ratings recognized by the
constitution were fixed, there should be power given by law to
raise or lower the qualification as the amount is greater or less.
Where this is not done a constitutional government passes into an
oligarchy, and an oligarchy is narrowed to a rule of families; or
in the opposite case constitutional government becomes democracy,
and oligarchy either constitutional government or democracy.
    It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy, and every
other form of government not to allow the disproportionate increase
of any citizen but to give moderate honor for a long time rather
than great honor for a short time. For men are easily spoilt; not
every one can bear prosperity. But if this rule is not observed, at
any rate the honors which are given all at once should be taken
away by degrees and not all at once. Especially should the laws
provide against any one having too much power, whether derived from
friends or money; if he has, he should be sent clean out of the
country. And since innovations creep in through the private life of
individuals also, there ought to be a magistracy which will have an
eye to those whose life is not in harmony with the government,
whether oligarchy or democracy or any other. And for a like reason
an increase of prosperity in any part of the state should be
carefully watched. The proper remedy for this evil is always to
give the management of affairs and offices of state to opposite
elements; such opposites are the virtuous and the many, or the rich
and the poor. Another way is to combine the poor and the rich in
one body, or to increase the middle class: thus an end will be put
to the revolutions which arise from inequality.
    But above all every state should be so administered and so
regulated by law that its magistrates cannot possibly make money.
In oligarchies special precautions should be used against this
evil. For the people do not take any great offense at being kept
out of the government—indeed they are rather pleased than otherwise
at having leisure for their private business—but what irritates
them is to think that their rulers are stealing the public money;
then they are doubly annoyed; for they lose both honor and profit.
If office brought no profit, then and then only could democracy and
aristocracy be combined; for both notables and people might have
their wishes gratified. All would be able to hold office, which is
the aim of democracy, and the notables would be magistrates, which
is the aim of aristocracy. And this result may be accomplished when
there is no possibility of making money out of the offices; for the
poor will not want to have them when there is nothing to be gained
from them—they would rather be attending to their own concerns; and
the rich, who do not want money from the public treasury, will be
able to take them; and so the poor will keep to their work and grow
rich, and the notables will not be governed by the lower class. In
order to avoid peculation of the public money, the transfer of the
revenue should be made at a general assembly of the citizens, and
duplicates of the accounts deposited with the different
brotherhoods, companies, and tribes. And honors should be given by
law to magistrates who have the reputation of being incorruptible.
In democracies the rich should be spared; not only should their
property not be divided, but their incomes also, which in some
states are taken from them imperceptibly, should be protected. It
is a good thing to prevent the wealthy citizens, even if they are
willing from undertaking expensive and useless public services,
such as the giving of choruses, torch-races, and the like. In an
oligarchy, on the other hand, great care should be taken of the
poor, and lucrative offices should go to them; if any of the
wealthy