The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

constitutional rule over them, even though
not unjust, is a great impediment to a man’s individual wellbeing.
Others take an opposite view; they maintain that the true life of
man is the practical and political, and that every virtue admits of
being practiced, quite as much by statesmen and rulers as by
private individuals. Others, again, are of opinion that arbitrary
and tyrannical rule alone consists with happiness; indeed, in some
states the entire aim both of the laws and of the constitution is
to give men despotic power over their neighbors. And, therefore,
although in most cities the laws may be said generally to be in a
chaotic state, still, if they aim at anything, they aim at the
maintenance of power: thus in Lacedaemon and Crete the system of
education and the greater part of the of the laws are framed with a
view to war. And in all nations which are able to gratify their
ambition military power is held in esteem, for example among the
Scythians and Persians and Thracians and Celts.
    In some nations there are even laws tending to stimulate the
warlike virtues, as at Carthage, where we are told that men obtain
the honor of wearing as many armlets as they have served campaigns.
There was once a law in Macedonia that he who had not killed an
enemy should wear a halter, and among the Scythians no one who had
not slain his man was allowed to drink out of the cup which was
handed round at a certain feast. Among the Iberians, a warlike
nation, the number of enemies whom a man has slain is indicated by
the number of obelisks which are fixed in the earth round his tomb;
and there are numerous practices among other nations of a like
kind, some of them established by law and others by custom. Yet to
a reflecting mind it must appear very strange that the statesman
should be always considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over
others, whether they will or not. How can that which is not even
lawful be the business of the statesman or the legislator? Unlawful
it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for there may be
might where there is no right. The other arts and sciences offer no
parallel a physician is not expected to persuade or coerce his
patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. Yet most men
appear to think that the art of despotic government is
statesmanship, and what men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in
their own case they are not ashamed of practicing towards others;
they demand just rule for themselves, but where other men are
concerned they care nothing about it. Such behavior is irrational;
unless the one party is, and the other is not, born to serve, in
which case men have a right to command, not indeed all their
fellows, but only those who are intended to be subjects; just as we
ought not to hunt mankind, whether for food or sacrifice, but only
the animals which may be hunted for food or sacrifice, this is to
say, such wild animals as are eatable. And surely there may be a
city happy in isolation, which we will assume to be well-governed
(for it is quite possible that a city thus isolated might be
well-administered and have good laws); but such a city would not be
constituted with any view to war or the conquest of enemies—all
that sort of thing must be excluded. Hence we see very plainly that
warlike pursuits, although generally to be deemed honorable, are
not the supreme end of all things, but only means. And the good
lawgiver should inquire how states and races of men and communities
may participate in a good life, and in the happiness which is
attainable by them. His enactments will not be always the same; and
where there are neighbors he will have to see what sort of studies
should be practiced in relation to their several characters, or how
the measures appropriate in relation to each are to be adopted. The
end at which the best form of government should aim may be properly
made a matter of future consideration.
III
    Let us now address those who, while they agree that the life of
virtue is the most eligible, differ about the manner of practicing
it. For some renounce political power, and think that the life of
the freeman is different from the life of the statesman and the
best of all; but others think the life of the statesman best. The
argument of the latter is that he who does nothing cannot do well,
and that virtuous activity is identical with happiness. To both we
say: ‘you are partly right and partly wrong.’ first class are right
in affirming that the life of