The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

and all things useful are of such a
nature that where there is too much of them they must either do
harm, or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors, every good
of the soul, the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the
epithet useful as well as noble is appropriate to such subjects. No
proof is required to show that the best state of one thing in
relation to another corresponds in degree of excellence to the
interval between the natures of which we say that these very states
are states: so that, if the soul is more noble than our possessions
or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be
admitted that the best state of either has a similar ratio to the
other. Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external
and goods of the body are eligible at all, and all wise men ought
to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the
sake of them.
    Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of
happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise
action. God is a witness to us of this truth, for he is happy and
blessed, not by reason of any external good, but in himself and by
reason of his own nature. And herein of necessity lies the
difference between good fortune and happiness; for external goods
come of themselves, and chance is the author of them, but no one is
just or temperate by or through chance. In like manner, and by a
similar train of argument, the happy state may be shown to be that
which is best and which acts rightly; and rightly it cannot act
without doing right actions, and neither individual nor state can
do right actions without virtue and wisdom. Thus the courage,
justice, and wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the
qualities which give the individual who possesses them the name of
just, wise, or temperate.
    Thus much may suffice by way of preface: for I could not avoid
touching upon these questions, neither could I go through all the
arguments affecting them; these are the business of another
science.
    Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and
states, is the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods
enough for the performance of good actions. If there are any who
controvert our assertion, we will in this treatise pass them over,
and consider their objections hereafter.
II
    There remains to be discussed the question whether the happiness
of the individual is the same as that of the state, or different.
Here again there can be no doubt—no one denies that they are the
same. For those who hold that the well-being of the individual
consists in his wealth, also think that riches make the happiness
of the whole state, and those who value most highly the life of a
tyrant deem that city the happiest which rules over the greatest
number; while they who approve an individual for his virtue say
that the more virtuous a city is, the happier it is. Two points
here present themselves for consideration: first (1), which is the
more eligible life, that of a citizen who is a member of a state,
or that of an alien who has no political ties; and again (2), which
is the best form of constitution or the best condition of a state,
either on the supposition that political privileges are desirable
for all, or for a majority only? Since the good of the state and
not of the individual is the proper subject of political thought
and speculation, and we are engaged in a political discussion,
while the first of these two points has a secondary interest for
us, the latter will be the main subject of our inquiry.
    Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which
every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily. But even
those who agree in thinking that the life of virtue is the most
eligible raise a question, whether the life of business and
politics is or is not more eligible than one which is wholly
independent of external goods, I mean than a contemplative life,
which by some is maintained to be the only one worthy of a
philosopher. For these two lives—the life of the philosopher and
the life of the statesman—appear to have been preferred by those
who have been most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own
and in other ages. Which is the better is a question of no small
moment; for the wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily
regulate his life according to the best end. There are some who
think that while a despotic rule over others is the greatest
injustice, to exercise a