The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

courageous only,
while in others there is a happy combination of both qualities. And
clearly those whom the legislator will most easily lead to virtue
may be expected to be both intelligent and courageous. Some say
that the guardians should be friendly towards those whom they know,
fierce towards those whom they do not know. Now, passion is the
quality of the soul which begets friendship and enables us to love;
notably the spirit within us is more stirred against our friends
and acquaintances than against those who are unknown to us, when we
think that we are despised by them; for which reason Archilochus,
complaining of his friends, very naturally addresses his soul in
these words:
For surely thou art plagued on account of friends.
    The power of command and the love of freedom are in all men
based upon this quality, for passion is commanding and invincible.
Nor is it right to say that the guardians should be fierce towards
those whom they do not know, for we ought not to be out of temper
with any one; and a lofty spirit is not fierce by nature, but only
when excited against evil-doers. And this, as I was saying before,
is a feeling which men show most strongly towards their friends if
they think they have received a wrong at their hands: as indeed is
reasonable; for, besides the actual injury, they seem to be
deprived of a benefit by those who owe them one. Hence the
saying:
Cruel is the strife of brethren,
    and again:
They who love in excess also hate in excess.
    Thus we have nearly determined the number and character of the
citizens of our state, and also the size and nature of their
territory. I say ‘nearly,’ for we ought not to require the same
minuteness in theory as in the facts given by perception.
VIII
    As in other natural compounds the conditions of a composite
whole are not necessarily organic parts of it, so in a state or in
any other combination forming a unity not everything is a part,
which is a necessary condition. The members of an association have
necessarily some one thing the same and common to all, in which
they share equally or unequally for example, food or land or any
other thing. But where there are two things of which one is a means
and the other an end, they have nothing in common except that the
one receives what the other produces. Such, for example, is the
relation which workmen and tools stand to their work; the house and
the builder have nothing in common, but the art of the builder is
for the sake of the house. And so states require property, but
property, even though living beings are included in it, is no part
of a state; for a state is not a community of living beings only,
but a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible. Now,
whereas happiness is the highest good, being a realization and
perfect practice of virtue, which some can attain, while others
have little or none of it, the various qualities of men are clearly
the reason why there are various kinds of states and many forms of
government; for different men seek after happiness in different
ways and by different means, and so make for themselves different
modes of life and forms of government. We must see also how many
things are indispensable to the existence of a state, for what we
call the parts of a state will be found among the indispensables.
Let us then enumerate the functions of a state, and we shall easily
elicit what we want:
    First, there must be food; secondly, arts, for life requires
many instruments; thirdly, there must be arms, for the members of a
community have need of them, and in their own hands, too, in order
to maintain authority both against disobedient subjects and against
external assailants; fourthly, there must be a certain amount of
revenue, both for internal needs, and for the purposes of war;
fifthly, or rather first, there must be a care of religion which is
commonly called worship; sixthly, and most necessary of all there
must be a power of deciding what is for the public interest, and
what is just in men’s dealings with one another.
    These are the services which every state may be said to need.
For a state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but a union of them
sufficing for the purposes of life; and if any of these things be
wanting, it is as we maintain impossible that the community can be
absolutely self-sufficing. A state then should be framed with a
view to the fulfillment of these functions. There must be
husbandmen to procure food, and artisans, and a warlike and