The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in
a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the
other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things
already done. The ceremonial orator is, properly speaking,
concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view
of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find
it useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the
future.
    Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its
three kinds. The political orator aims at establishing the
expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he
urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do
good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it
will do harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is
just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as
subsidiary and relative to this main consideration. Parties in a
law-case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some
action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary and
relative to this one. Those who praise or attack a man aim at
proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and they too treat all
other considerations with reference to this one.
    That the three kinds of rhetoric do aim respectively at the
three ends we have mentioned is shown by the fact that speakers
will sometimes not try to establish anything else. Thus, the
litigant will sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that
he has done harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never
admit; otherwise there would be no need of a trial. So too,
political orators often make any concession short of admitting that
they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course
or not to take an expedient one. The question whether it is not
unjust for a city to enslave its innocent neighbours often does not
trouble them at all. In like manner those who praise or censure a
man do not consider whether his acts have been expedient or not,
but often make it a ground of actual praise that he has neglected
his own interest to do what was honourable. Thus, they praise
Achilles because he championed his fallen friend Patroclus, though
he knew that this meant death, and that otherwise he need not die:
yet while to die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the
expedient thing was to live on.
    It is evident from what has been said that it is these three
subjects, more than any others, about which the orator must be able
to have propositions at his command. Now the propositions of
Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs. Every kind
of syllogism is composed of propositions, and the enthymeme is a
particular kind of syllogism composed of the aforesaid
propositions.
    Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever
have been done in the past or the present, and since things which
have not occurred, or will not occur, also cannot have been done or
be going to be done, it is necessary for the political, the
forensic, and the ceremonial speaker alike to be able to have at
their command propositions about the possible and the impossible,
and about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not
occur. Further, all men, in giving praise or blame, in urging us to
accept or reject proposals for action, in accusing others or
defending themselves, attempt not only to prove the points
mentioned but also to show that the good or the harm, the honour or
disgrace, the justice or injustice, is great or small, either
absolutely or relatively; and therefore it is plain that we must
also have at our command propositions about greatness or smallness
and the greater or the lesser-propositions both universal and
particular. Thus, we must be able to say which is the greater or
lesser good, the greater or lesser act of justice or injustice; and
so on.
    Such, then, are the subjects regarding which we are inevitably
bound to master the propositions relevant to them. We must now
discuss each particular class of these subjects in turn, namely
those dealt with in political, in ceremonial, and lastly in legal,
oratory.
4
    First, then, we must ascertain what are the kinds of things,
good or bad, about which the political orator offers counsel. For
he does not deal with all things, but only with such as may or may
not take place. Concerning things which exist or will exist
inevitably, or which cannot possibly exist or take place, no
counsel can be