The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

out they can escape being punished, or
that if they are punished the disadvantage will be less than the
gain for themselves or those they care for. The general subject of
apparent possibility and impossibility will be handled later on,
since it is relevant not only to forensic but to all kinds of
speaking. But it may here be said that people think that they can
themselves most easily do wrong to others without being punished
for it if they possess eloquence, or practical ability, or much
legal experience, or a large body of friends, or a great deal of
money. Their confidence is greatest if they personally possess the
advantages mentioned: but even without them they are satisfied if
they have friends or supporters or partners who do possess them:
they can thus both commit their crimes and escape being found out
and punished for committing them. They are also safe, they think,
if they are on good terms with their victims or with the judges who
try them. Their victims will in that case not be on their guard
against being wronged, and will make some arrangement with them
instead of prosecuting; while their judges will favour them because
they like them, either letting them off altogether or imposing
light sentences. They are not likely to be found out if their
appearance contradicts the charges that might be brought against
them: for instance, a weakling is unlikely to be charged with
violent assault, or a poor and ugly man with adultery. Public and
open injuries are the easiest to do, because nobody could at all
suppose them possible, and therefore no precautions are taken. The
same is true of crimes so great and terrible that no man living
could be suspected of them: here too no precautions are taken. For
all men guard against ordinary offences, just as they guard against
ordinary diseases; but no one takes precautions against a disease
that nobody has ever had. You feel safe, too, if you have either no
enemies or a great many; if you have none, you expect not to be
watched and therefore not to be detected; if you have a great many,
you will be watched, and therefore people will think you can never
risk an attempt on them, and you can defend your innocence by
pointing out that you could never have taken such a risk. You may
also trust to hide your crime by the way you do it or the place you
do it in, or by some convenient means of disposal.
    You may feel that even if you are found out you can stave off a
trial, or have it postponed, or corrupt your judges: or that even
if you are sentenced you can avoid paying damages, or can at least
postpone doing so for a long time: or that you are so badly off
that you will have nothing to lose. You may feel that the gain to
be got by wrong-doing is great or certain or immediate, and that
the penalty is small or uncertain or distant. It may be that the
advantage to be gained is greater than any possible retribution: as
in the case of despotic power, according to the popular view. You
may consider your crimes as bringing you solid profit, while their
punishment is nothing more than being called bad names. Or the
opposite argument may appeal to you: your crimes may bring you some
credit (thus you may, incidentally, be avenging your father or
mother, like Zeno), whereas the punishment may amount to a fine, or
banishment, or something of that sort. People may be led on to
wrong others by either of these motives or feelings; but no man by
both-they will affect people of quite opposite characters. You may
be encouraged by having often escaped detection or punishment
already; or by having often tried and failed; for in crime, as in
war, there are men who will always refuse to give up the struggle.
You may get your pleasure on the spot and the pain later, or the
gain on the spot and the loss later. That is what appeals to
weak-willed persons—and weakness of will may be shown with regard
to all the objects of desire. It may on the contrary appeal to you
as it does appeal to self-controlled and sensible people—that the
pain and loss are immediate, while the pleasure and profit come
later and last longer. You may feel able to make it appear that
your crime was due to chance, or to necessity, or to natural
causes, or to habit: in fact, to put it generally, as if you had
failed to do right rather than actually done wrong. You may be able
to trust other people to judge you equitably. You may be stimulated
by being in want: which may mean that you want necessaries, as poor
people do, or that