The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

to
love-if you love wine, you certainly find it delightful: and it is
pleasant to be loved, for this too makes a man see himself as the
possessor of goodness, a thing that every being that has a feeling
for it desires to possess: to be loved means to be valued for one’s
own personal qualities. To be admired is also pleasant, simply
because of the honour implied. Flattery and flatterers are
pleasant: the flatterer is a man who, you believe, admires and
likes To do the same thing often is pleasant, since, as we saw,
anything habitual is pleasant. And to change is also pleasant:
change means an approach to nature, whereas invariable repetition
of anything causes the excessive prolongation of a settled
condition: therefore, says the poet,
Change is in all things sweet.
    That is why what comes to us only at long intervals is pleasant,
whether it be a person or a thing; for it is a change from what we
had before, and, besides, what comes only at long intervals has the
value of rarity. Learning things and wondering at things are also
pleasant as a rule; wondering implies the desire of learning, so
that the object of wonder is an object of desire; while in learning
one is brought into one’s natural condition. Conferring and
receiving benefits belong to the class of pleasant things; to
receive a benefit is to get what one desires; to confer a benefit
implies both posses sion and superiority, both of which are things
we try to attain. It is because beneficent acts are pleasant that
people find it pleasant to put their neighbours straight again and
to supply what they lack. Again, since learning and wondering are
pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be
pleasant-for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry and every
product of skilful imitation; this latter, even if the object
imitated is not itself pleasant; for it is not the object itself
which here gives delight; the spectator draws inferences (’That is
a so-and-so’) and thus learns something fresh. Dramatic turns of
fortune and hairbreadth escapes from perils are pleasant, because
we feel all such things are wonderful.
    And since what is natural is pleasant, and things akin to each
other seem natural to each other, therefore all kindred and similar
things are usually pleasant to each other; for instance, one man,
horse, or young person is pleasant to another man, horse, or young
person. Hence the proverbs ‘mate delights mate’, ‘like to like’,
‘beast knows beast’, ‘jackdaw to jackdaw’, and the rest of them.
But since everything like and akin to oneself is pleasant, and
since every man is himself more like and akin to himself than any
one else is, it follows that all of us must be more or less fond of
ourselves. For all this resemblance and kinship is present
particularly in the relation of an individual to himself. And
because we are all fond of ourselves, it follows that what is our
own is pleasant to all of us, as for instance our own deeds and
words. That is why we are usually fond of our flatterers, [our
lovers,] and honour; also of our children, for our children are our
own work. It is also pleasant to complete what is defective, for
the whole thing thereupon becomes our own work. And since power
over others is very pleasant, it is pleasant to be thought wise,
for practical wisdom secures us power over others. (Scientific
wisdom is also pleasant, because it is the knowledge of many
wonderful things.) Again, since most of us are ambitious, it must
be pleasant to disparage our neighbours as well as to have power
over them. It is pleasant for a man to spend his time over what he
feels he can do best; just as the poet says,
To that he bends himself,
To that each day allots most time, wherein
He is indeed the best part of himself.
    Similarly, since amusement and every kind of relaxation and
laughter too belong to the class of pleasant things, it follows
that ludicrous things are pleasant, whether men, words, or deeds.
We have discussed the ludicrous separately in the treatise on the
Art of Poetry.
    So much for the subject of pleasant things: by considering their
opposites we can easily see what things are unpleasant.
12
    The above are the motives that make men do wrong to others; we
are next to consider the states of mind in which they do it, and
the persons to whom they do it.
    They must themselves suppose that the thing can be done, and
done by them: either that they can do it without being found out,
or that if they are found