The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

honest opinion’ not meant to make the judges give a verdict that
is contrary to the law, but to save them from the guilt of perjury
if they misunderstand what the law really means. Or that no one
chooses what is absolutely good, but every one what is good for
himself. Or that not to use the laws is as ahas to have no laws at
all. Or that, as in the other arts, it does not pay to try to be
cleverer than the doctor: for less harm comes from the doctor’s
mistakes than from the growing habit of disobeying authority. Or
that trying to be cleverer than the laws is just what is forbidden
by those codes of law that are accounted best.-So far as the laws
are concerned, the above discussion is probably sufficient.
    As to witnesses, they are of two kinds, the ancient and the
recent; and these latter, again, either do or do not share in the
risks of the trial. By ‘ancient’ witnesses I mean the poets and all
other notable persons whose judgements are known to all. Thus the
Athenians appealed to Homer as a witness about Salamis; and the men
of Tenedos not long ago appealed to Periander of Corinth in their
dispute with the people of Sigeum; and Cleophon supported his
accusation of Critias by quoting the elegiac verse of Solon,
maintaining that discipline had long been slack in the family of
Critias, or Solon would never have written,
Pray thee, bid the red-haired Critias do what
his father commands him.
    These witnesses are concerned with past events. As to future
events we shall also appeal to soothsayers: thus Themistocles
quoted the oracle about ‘the wooden wall’ as a reason for engaging
the enemy’s fleet. Further, proverbs are, as has been said, one
form of evidence. Thus if you are urging somebody not to make a
friend of an old man, you will appeal to the proverb,
Never show an old man kindness.
    Or if you are urging that he who has made away with fathers
should also make away with their sons, quote,
Fool, who slayeth the father and leaveth his sons to avenge
him.
    ‘Recent’ witnesses are well-known people who have expressed
their opinions about some disputed matter: such opinions will be
useful support for subsequent disputants on the same oints: thus
Eubulus used in the law-courts against the reply Plato had made to
Archibius, ‘It has become the regular custom in this country to
admit that one is a scoundrel’. There are also those witnesses who
share the risk of punishment if their evidence is pronounced false.
These are valid witnesses to the fact that an action was or was not
done, that something is or is not the case; they are not valid
witnesses to the quality of an action, to its being just or unjust,
useful or harmful. On such questions of quality the opinion of
detached persons is highly trustworthy. Most trustworthy of all are
the ‘ancient’ witnesses, since they cannot be corrupted.
    In dealing with the evidence of witnesses, the following are
useful arguments. If you have no witnesses on your side, you will
argue that the judges must decide from what is probable; that this
is meant by ‘giving a verdict in accordance with one’s honest
opinion’; that probabilities cannot be bribed to mislead the court;
and that probabilities are never convicted of perjury. If you have
witnesses, and the other man has not, you will argue that
probabilities cannot be put on their trial, and that we could do
without the evidence of witnesses altogether if we need do no more
than balance the pleas advanced on either side.
    The evidence of witnesses may refer either to ourselves or to
our opponent; and either to questions of fact or to questions of
personal character: so, clearly, we need never be at a loss for
useful evidence. For if we have no evidence of fact supporting our
own case or telling against that of our opponent, at least we can
always find evidence to prove our own worth or our opponent’s
worthlessness. Other arguments about a witness-that he is a friend
or an enemy or neutral, or has a good, bad, or indifferent
reputation, and any other such distinctions-we must construct upon
the same general lines as we use for the regular rhetorical
proofs.
    Concerning contracts argument can be so far employed as to
increase or diminish their importance and their credibility; we
shall try to increase both if they tell in our favour, and to
diminish both if they tell in favour of our opponent. Now for
confirming or upsetting the credibility of contracts the procedure
is just the same as for dealing with