The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

frailty, in a character either such as we have described,
or better rather than worse. The practice of the stage bears out
our view. At first the poets recounted any legend that came in
their way. Now, the best tragedies are founded on the story of a
few houses—on the fortunes of Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager,
Thyestes, Telephus, and those others who have done or suffered
something terrible. A tragedy, then, to be perfect according to the
rules of art should be of this construction. Hence they are in
error who censure Euripides just because he follows this principle
in his plays, many of which end unhappily. It is, as we have said,
the right ending. The best proof is that on the stage and in
dramatic competition, such plays, if well worked out, are the most
tragic in effect; and Euripides, faulty though he may be in the
general management of his subject, yet is felt to be the most
tragic of the poets.
    In the second rank comes the kind of tragedy which some place
first. Like the Odyssey, it has a double thread of plot, and also
an opposite catastrophe for the good and for the bad. It is
accounted the best because of the weakness of the spectators; for
the poet is guided in what he writes by the wishes of his audience.
The pleasure, however, thence derived is not the true tragic
pleasure. It is proper rather to Comedy, where those who, in the
piece, are the deadliest enemies—like Orestes and Aegisthus—quit
the stage as friends at the close, and no one slays or is
slain.
XIV
    Fear and pity may be aroused by spectacular means; but they may
also result from the inner structure of the piece, which is the
better way, and indicates a superior poet. For the plot ought to be
so constructed that, even without the aid of the eye, he who hears
the tale told will thrill with horror and melt to pity at what
takes Place. This is the impression we should receive from hearing
the story of the Oedipus. But to produce this effect by the mere
spectacle is a less artistic method, and dependent on extraneous
aids. Those who employ spectacular means to create a sense not of
the terrible but only of the monstrous, are strangers to the
purpose of Tragedy; for we must not demand of Tragedy any and every
kind of pleasure, but only that which is proper to it. And since
the pleasure which the poet should afford is that which comes from
pity and fear through imitation, it is evident that this quality
must be impressed upon the incidents.
    Let us then determine what are the circumstances which strike us
as terrible or pitiful.
    Actions capable of this effect must happen between persons who
are either friends or enemies or indifferent to one another. If an
enemy kills an enemy, there is nothing to excite pity either in the
act or the intention—except so far as the suffering in itself is
pitiful. So again with indifferent persons. But when the tragic
incident occurs between those who are near or dear to one
another—if, for example, a brother kills, or intends to kill, a
brother, a son his father, a mother her son, a son his mother, or
any other deed of the kind is done—these are the situations to be
looked for by the poet. He may not indeed destroy the framework of
the received legends—the fact, for instance, that Clytemnestra was
slain by Orestes and Eriphyle by Alcmaeon—but he ought to show of
his own, and skilfully handle the traditional. material. Let us
explain more clearly what is meant by skilful handling.
    The action may be done consciously and with knowledge of the
persons, in the manner of the older poets. It is thus too that
Euripides makes Medea slay her children. Or, again, the deed of
horror may be done, but done in ignorance, and the tie of kinship
or friendship be discovered afterwards. The Oedipus of Sophocles is
an example. Here, indeed, the incident is outside the drama proper;
but cases occur where it falls within the action of the play: one
may cite the Alcmaeon of Astydamas, or Telegonus in the Wounded
Odysseus. Again, there is a third case—[to be about to act with
knowledge of the persons and then not to act. The fourth case] is
when some one is about to do an irreparable deed through ignorance,
and makes the discovery before it is done. These are the only
possible ways. For the deed must either be done or not done—and
that wittingly or unwittingly. But of all these ways, to be about
to act knowing the persons, and then not to act, is the worst. It
is shocking without being tragic, for no disaster