The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

for a man to forget his disgraceful conduct be a good
thing, and to remember it be an evil thing, then the knowledge of
his disgraceful conduct may be taken to be an evil thing. The same
holds also in other cases: in all such cases the premiss and the
conclusion are equally likely to be accepted.
    Moreover you should judge by means of greater or smaller or like
degrees: for if some member of another genus exhibit such and such
a character in a more marked degree than your object, while no
member of that genus exhibits that character at all, then you may
take it that neither does the object in question exhibit it; e.g.
if some form of knowledge be good in a greater degree than
pleasure, while no form of knowledge is good, then you may take it
that pleasure is not good either. Also, you should judge by a
smaller or like degree in the same way: for so you will find it
possible both to demolish and to establish a view, except that
whereas both are possible by means of like degrees, by means of a
smaller degree it is possible only to establish, not to overthrow.
For if a certain form of capacity be good in a like degree to
knowledge, and a certain form of capacity be good, then so also is
knowledge; while if no form of capacity be good, then neither is
knowledge. If, too, a certain form of capacity be good in a less
degree than knowledge, and a certain form of capacity be good, then
so also is knowledge; but if no form of capacity be good, there is
no necessity that no form of knowledge either should be good.
Clearly, then, it is only possible to establish a view by means of
a less degree.
    Not only by means of another genus can you overthrow a view, but
also by means of the same, if you take the most marked instance of
the character in question; e.g. if it be maintained that some form
of knowledge is good, then, suppose it to be shown that prudence is
not good, neither will any other kind be good, seeing that not even
the kind upon which there is most general agreement is so.
Moreover, you should go to work by means of an hypothesis; you
should claim that the attribute, if it belongs or does not belong
in one case, does so in a like degree in all, e.g. that if the soul
of man be immortal, so are other souls as well, while if this one
be not so, neither are the others. If, then, it be maintained that
in some instance the attribute belongs, you must show that in some
instance it does not belong: for then it will follow, by reason of
the hypothesis, that it does not belong to any instance at all. If,
on the other hand, it be maintained that it does not belong in some
instance, you must show that it does belong in some instance, for
in this way it will follow that it belongs to all instances. It is
clear that the maker of the hypothesis universalizes the question,
whereas it was stated in a particular form: for he claims that the
maker of a particular admission should make a universal admission,
inasmuch as he claims that if the attribute belongs in one
instance, it belongs also in all instances alike.
    If the problem be indefinite, it is possible to overthrow a
statement in only one way; e.g. if a man has asserted that pleasure
is good or is not good, without any further definition. For if he
meant that a particular pleasure is good, you must show universally
that no pleasure is good, if the proposition in question is to be
demolished. And likewise, also, if he meant that some particular
pleasure is not good you must show universally that all pleasure is
good: it is impossible to demolish it in any other way. For if we
show that some particular pleasure is not good or is good, the
proposition in question is not yet demolished. It is clear, then,
that it is possible to demolish an indefinite statement in one way
only, whereas it can be established in two ways: for whether we
show universally that all pleasure is good, or whether we show that
a particular pleasure is good, the proposition in question will
have been proved. Likewise, also, supposing we are required to
argue that some particular pleasure is not good, if we show that no
pleasure is good or that a particular pleasure is not good, we
shall have produced an argument in both ways, both universally and
in particular, to show that some particular pleasure is not good.
If, on the other hand, the statement made be definite, it will be
possible to demolish it in two ways; e.g. if it be maintained that
it is an attribute of some particular pleasure to be good, while