The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

the good: thus justice
is better than a just man. Also, that which is more like than
another thing to something better than itself, as e.g. some say
that Ajax was a better man than Odysseus because he was more like
Achilles. An objection may be raised to this that it is not true:
for it is quite possible that Ajax did not resemble Achilles more
nearly than Odysseus in the points which made Achilles the best of
them, and that Odysseus was a good man, though unlike Achilles.
Look also to see whether the resemblance be that of a caricature,
like the resemblance of a monkey to a man, whereas a horse bears
none: for the monkey is not the more handsome creature, despite its
nearer resemblance to a man. Again, in the case of two things, if
one is more like the better thing while another is more like the
worse, then that is likely to be better which is more like the
better. This too, however, admits of an objection: for quite
possibly the one only slightly resembles the better, while the
other strongly resembles the worse, e.g. supposing the resemblance
of Ajax to Achilles to be slight, while that of Odysseus to Nestor
is strong. Also it may be that the one which is like the better
type shows a degrading likeness, whereas the one which is like the
worse type improves upon it: witness the likeness of a horse to a
donkey, and that of a monkey to a man.
    Another rule is that the more conspicuous good is more desirable
than the less conspicuous, and the more difficult than the easier:
for we appreciate better the possession of things that cannot be
easily acquired. Also the more personal possession is more
desirable than the more widely shared. Also, that which is more
free from connexion with evil: for what is not attended by any
unpleasantness is more desirable than what is so attended.
    Moreover, if A be without qualification better than B, then also
the best of the members of A is better than the best of the members
of B; e.g. if Man be better than Horse, then also the best man is
better than the best horse. Also, if the best in A be better than
the best in B, then also A is better than B without qualification;
e.g. if the best man be better than the best horse, then also Man
is better than Horse without qualification.
    Moreover, things which our friends can share are more desirable
than those they cannot. Also, things which we like rather to do to
our friend are more desirable than those we like to do to the man
in the street, e.g. just dealing and the doing of good rather than
the semblance of them: for we would rather really do good to our
friends than seem to do so, whereas towards the man in the street
the converse is the case.
    Also, superfluities are better than necessities, and are
sometimes more desirable as well: for the good life is better than
mere life, and good life is a superfluity, whereas mere life itself
is a necessity. Sometimes, though, what is better is not also more
desirable: for there is no necessity that because it is better it
should also be more desirable: at least to be a philosopher is
better than to make money, but it is not more desirable for a man
who lacks the necessities of life. The expression ‘superfluity’
applies whenever a man possesses the necessities of life and sets
to work to secure as well other noble acquisitions. Roughly
speaking, perhaps, necessities are more desirable, while
superfluities are better.
    Also, what cannot be got from another is more desirable than
what can be got from another as well, as (e.g.) is the case of
justice compared with courage. Also, A is more desirable if A is
desirable without B, but not B without A: power (e.g.) is not
desirable without prudence, but prudence is desirable without
power. Also, if of two things we repudiate the one in order to be
thought to possess the other, then that one is more desirable which
we wish to be thought to possess; thus (e.g.) we repudiate the love
of hard work in order that people may think us geniuses.
    Moreover, that is more desirable in whose absence it is less
blameworthy for people to be vexed; and that is more desirable in
whose absence it is more blameworthy for a man not to be vexed.
<
    div id="section32" class="section" title="3">
3
    Moreover, of things that belong to the same species one which
possesses the peculiar virtue of the species is more desirable than
one which does not. If both possess it, then the one which
possesses it in a greater degree is more desirable.
    Moreover, if one thing makes good