The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

whatever it touches, while
another does not, the former is more desirable, just as also what
makes things warm is warmer than what does not. If both do so, then
that one is more desirable which does so in a greater degree, or if
it render good the better and more important object-if (e.g.), the
one makes good the soul, and the other the body.
    Moreover, judge things by their inflexions and uses and actions
and works, and judge these by them: for they go with each other:
e.g. if ‘justly’ means something more desirable than
‘courageously’, then also justice means something more desirable
than courage; and if justice be more desirable than courage, then
also ‘justly’ means something more desirable than ‘courageously’.
Similarly also in the other cases.
    Moreover, if one thing exceeds while the other falls short of
the same standard of good, the one which exceeds is the more
desirable; or if the one exceeds an even higher standard. Nay more,
if there be two things both preferable to something, the one which
is more highly preferable to it is more desirable than the less
highly preferable. Moreover, when the excess of a thing is more
desirable than the excess of something else, that thing is itself
also more desirable than the other, as (e.g.) friendship than
money: for an excess of friendship is more desirable than an excess
of money. So also that of which a man would rather that it were his
by his own doing is more desirable than what he would rather get by
another’s doing, e.g. friends than money. Moreover, judge by means
of an addition, and see if the addition of A to the same thing as B
makes the whole more desirable than does the addition of B. You
must, however, beware of adducing a case in which the common term
uses, or in some other way helps the case of, one of the things
added to it, but not the other, as (e.g.) if you took a saw and a
sickle in combination with the art of carpentry: for in the
combination the saw is a more desirable thing, but it is not a more
desirable thing without qualification. Again, a thing is more
desirable if, when added to a lesser good, it makes the whole
greater good. Likewise, also, you should judge by means of
subtraction: for the thing upon whose subtraction the remainder is
a lesser good may be taken to be a greater good, whichever it be
whose subtraction makes the remainder a lesser good.
    Also, if one thing be desirable for itself, and the other for
the look of it, the former is more desirable, as (e.g.) health than
beauty. A thing is defined as being desired for the look of it if,
supposing no one knew of it, you would not care to have it. Also,
it is more desirable both for itself and for the look of it, while
the other thing is desirable on the one ground alone. Also,
whichever is the more precious for itself, is also better and more
desirable. A thing may be taken to be more precious in itself which
we choose rather for itself, without anything else being likely to
come of it.
    Moreover, you should distinguish in how many senses ‘desirable’
is used, and with a view to what ends, e.g. expediency or honour or
pleasure. For what is useful for all or most of them may be taken
to be more desirable than what is not useful in like manner. If the
same characters belong to both things you should look and see which
possesses them more markedly, i.e. which of the two is the more
pleasant or more honourable or more expedient. Again, that is more
desirable which serves the better purpose, e.g. that which serves
to promote virtue more than that which serves to promote pleasure.
Likewise also in the case of objectionable things; for that is more
objectionable which stands more in the way of what is desirable,
e.g. disease more than ugliness: for disease is a greater hindrance
both to pleasure and to being good.
    Moreover, argue by showing that the thing in question is in like
measure objectionable and desirable: for a thing of such a
character that a man might well desire and object to it alike is
less desirable than the other which is desirable only.
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4
    Comparisons of things together should therefore be conducted in
the manner prescribed. The same commonplace rules are useful also
for showing that anything is simply desirable or objectionable: for
we have only to subtract the excess of one thing over another. For
if what is more precious be more desirable, then also what is
precious is desirable; and if what is more