The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

genus is
relative. Or see if a relative term has been described not in
relation to its end, the end in anything being whatever is best in
it or gives its purpose to the rest. Certainly it is what is best
or final that should be stated, e.g. that desire is not for the
pleasant but for pleasure: for this is our purpose in choosing what
is pleasant as well.
    Look and see also if that in relation to which he has rendered
the term be a process or an activity: for nothing of that kind is
an end, for the completion of the activity or process is the end
rather than the process or activity itself. Or perhaps this rule is
not true in all cases, for almost everybody prefers the present
experience of pleasure to its cessation, so that they would count
the activity as the end rather than its completion.
    Again see in some cases if he has failed to distinguish the
quantity or quality or place or other differentiae of an object;
e.g. the quality and quantity of the honour the striving for which
makes a man ambitious: for all men strive for honour, so that it is
not enough to define the ambitious man as him who strives for
honour, but the aforesaid differentiae must be added. Likewise,
also, in defining the covetous man the quantity of money he aims
at, or in the case of the incontinent man the quality of the
pleasures, should be stated. For it is not the man who gives way to
any sort of pleasure whatever who is called incontinent, but only
he who gives way to a certain kind of pleasure. Or again, people
sometimes define night as a ‘shadow on the earth’, or an earthquake
as a movement of the earth’, or a cloud as ‘condensation of the
air’, or a wind as a ‘movement of the air’; whereas they ought to
specify as well quantity, quality, place, and cause. Likewise,
also, in other cases of the kind: for by omitting any differentiae
whatever he fails to state the essence of the term. One should
always attack deficiency. For a movement of the earth does not
constitute an earthquake, nor a movement of the air a wind,
irrespective of its manner and the amount involved.
    Moreover, in the case of conations, and in any other cases where
it applies, see if the word ‘apparent’ is left out, e.g. ‘wishing
is a conation after the good’, or ‘desire is a conation after the
pleasant’-instead of saying ‘the apparently good’, or ‘pleasant’.
For often those who exhibit the conation do not perceive what is
good or pleasant, so that their aim need not be really good or
pleasant, but only apparently so. They ought, therefore, to have
rendered the definition also accordingly. On the other hand, any
one who maintains the existence of Ideas ought to be brought face
to face with his Ideas, even though he does render the word in
question: for there can be no Idea of anything merely apparent: the
general view is that an Idea is always spoken of in relation to an
Idea: thus absolute desire is for the absolutely pleasant, and
absolute wishing is for the absolutely good; they therefore cannot
be for an apparent good or an apparently pleasant: for the
existence of an absolutely-apparently-good or pleasant would be an
absurdity.
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9
    Moreover, if the definition be of the state of anything, look at
what is in the state, while if it be of what is in the state, look
at the state: and likewise also in other cases of the kind. Thus if
the pleasant be identical with the beneficial, then, too, the man
who is pleased is benefited. Speaking generally, in definitions of
this sort it happens that what the definer defines is in a sense
more than one thing: for in defining knowledge, a man in a sense
defines ignorance as well, and likewise also what has knowledge and
what lacks it, and what it is to know and to be ignorant. For if
the first be made clear, the others become in a certain sense clear
as well. We have, then, to be on our guard in all such cases
against discrepancy, using the elementary principles drawn from
consideration of contraries and of coordinates.
    Moreover, in the case of relative terms, see if the species is
rendered as relative to a species of that to which the genus is
rendered as relative, e.g. supposing belief to be relative to some
object of belief, see whether a particular belief is made relative
to some particular object of belief: and, if a multiple be relative
to a fraction, see whether a particular multiple be made relative
to a particular fraction. For if it be not so