The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

statement laid down by the answerer be
neither rejected generally nor generally accepted; for then, too,
anything that appears to be true should be granted, and, of the
views not generally accepted, any that are more generally accepted
than the questioner’s conclusion; for in that case the result will
be that the arguments will be more generally accepted. If, then,
the view laid down by the answerer be one that is generally
accepted or rejected without qualification, then the views that are
accepted absolutely must be taken as the standard of comparison:
whereas if the view laid down be one that is not generally accepted
or rejected, but only by the answerer, then the standard whereby
the latter must judge what is generally accepted or not, and must
grant or refuse to grant the point asked, is himself. If, again,
the answerer be defending some one else’s opinion, then clearly it
will be the latter’s judgement to which he must have regard in
granting or denying the various points. This is why those, too, who
introduce other’s opinions, e.g. that ‘good and evil are the same
thing, as Heraclitus says,’ refuse to admit the impossibility of
contraries belonging at the same time to the same thing; not
because they do not themselves believe this, but because on
Heraclitus’ principles one has to say so. The same thing is done
also by those who take on the defence of one another’s positions;
their aim being to speak as would the man who stated the
position.
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6
    It is clear, then, what the aims of the answerer should be,
whether the position he lays down be a view generally accepted
without qualification or accepted by some definite person. Now
every question asked is bound to involve some view that is either
generally held or generally rejected or neither, and is also bound
to be either relevant to the argument or irrelevant: if then it be
a view generally accepted and irrelevant, the answerer should grant
it and remark that it is the accepted view: if it be a view not
generally accepted and irrelevant, he should grant it but add a
comment that it is not generally accepted, in order to avoid the
appearance of being a simpleton. If it be relevant and also be
generally accepted, he should admit that it is the view generally
accepted but say that it lies too close to the original
proposition, and that if it be granted the problem proposed
collapses. If what is claimed by the questioner be relevant but too
generally rejected, the answerer, while admitting that if it be
granted the conclusion sought follows, should yet protest that the
proposition is too absurd to be admitted. Suppose, again, it be a
view that is neither rejected generally nor generally accepted,
then, if it be irrelevant to the argument, it may be granted
without restriction; if, however, it be relevant, the answerer
should add the comment that, if it be granted, the original problem
collapses. For then the answerer will not be held to be personally
accountable for what happens to him, if he grants the several
points with his eyes open, and also the questioner will be able to
draw his inference, seeing that all the premisses that are more
generally accepted than the conclusion are granted him. Those who
try to draw an inference from premisses more generally rejected
than the conclusion clearly do not reason correctly: hence, when
men ask these things, they ought not to be granted.
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7
    The questioner should be met in a like manner also in the case
of terms used obscurely, i.e. in several senses. For the answerer,
if he does not understand, is always permitted to say ‘I do not
understand’: he is not compelled to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to a
question which may mean different things. Clearly, then, in the
first place, if what is said be not clear, he ought not to hesitate
to say that he does not understand it; for often people encounter
some difficulty from assenting to questions that are not clearly
put. If he understands the question and yet it covers many senses,
then supposing what it says to be universally true or false, he
should give it an unqualified assent or denial: if, on the other
hand, it be partly true and partly false, he should add a comment
that it bears different senses, and also that in one it is true, in
the other false: for if he leave this distinction till later, it
becomes uncertain whether originally as well he perceived