The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

conclusion; whereas in a
dialectical exercise he may do so if he is merely satisfied of its
truth. Clearly, then, the circumstances under which such admissions
should be claimed are different for a mere questioner and for a
serious teacher.
<
    div id="section72" class="section" title="4">
4
    As to the formulation, then, and arrangement of one’s questions,
about enough has been said.
    With regard to the giving of answers, we must first define what
is the business of a good answerer, as of a good questioner. The
business of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make
the answerer utter the most extrvagant paradoxes that necessarily
follow because of his position: while that of the answerer is to
make it appear that it is not he who is responsible for the
absurdity or paradox, but only his position: for one may, perhaps,
distinguish between the mistake of taking up a wrong position to
start with, and that of not maintaining it properly, when once
taken up.
<
    div id="section73" class="section" title="5">
5
    Inasmuch as no rules are laid down for those who argue for the
sake of training and of examination:-and the aim of those engaged
in teaching or learning is quite different from that of those
engaged in a competition; as is the latter from that of those who
discuss things together in the spirit of inquiry: for a learner
should always state what he thinks: for no one is even trying to
teach him what is false; whereas in a competition the business of
the questioner is to appear by all means to produce an effect upon
the other, while that of the answerer is to appear unaffected by
him; on the other hand, in an assembly of disputants discussing in
the spirit not of a competition but of an examination and inquiry,
there are as yet no articulate rules about what the answerer should
aim at, and what kind of things he should and should not grant for
the correct or incorrect defence of his position:-inasmuch, then,
as we have no tradition bequeathed to us by others, let us try to
say something upon the matter for ourselves.
    The thesis laid down by the answerer before facing the
questioner’s argument is bound of necessity to be one that is
either generally accepted or generally rejected or else is neither:
and moreover is so accepted or rejected either absolutely or else
with a restriction, e.g. by some given person, by the speaker or by
some one else. The manner, however, of its acceptance or rejection,
whatever it be, makes no difference: for the right way to answer,
i.e. to admit or to refuse to admit what has been asked, will be
the same in either case. If, then, the statement laid down by the
answerer be generally rejected, the conclusion aimed at by the
questioner is bound to be one generally accepted, whereas if the
former be generally accepted, the latter is generally rejected: for
the conclusion which the questioner tries to draw is always the
opposite of the statement laid down. If, on the other hand, what is
laid down is generally neither rejected nor accepted, the
conclusion will be of the same type as well. Now since a man who
reasons correctly demonstrates his proposed conclusion from
premisses that are more generally accepted, and more familiar, it
is clear that (1) where the view laid down by him is one that
generally is absolutely rejected, the answerer ought not to grant
either what is thus absolutely not accepted at all, or what is
accepted indeed, but accepted less generally than the questioner’s
conclusion. For if the statement laid down by the answerer be
generally rejected, the conclusion aimed at by the questioner will
be one that is generally accepted, so that the premisses secured by
the questioner should all be views generally accepted, and more
generally accepted than his proposed conclusion, if the less
familiar is to be inferred through the more familiar. Consequently,
if any of the questions put to him be not of this character, the
answerer should not grant them. (2) If, on the other hand, the
statement laid down by the answerer be generally accepted without
qualification, clearly the conclusion sought by the questioner will
be one generally rejected without qualification. Accordingly, the
answerer should admit all views that are generally accepted and, of
those that are not generally accepted, all that are less generally
rejected than the conclusion sought by the questioner. For then he
will probably be thought to have argued sufficiently well. (3)
Likewise, too, if the