The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

the
ambiguity or not. If he does not foresee the ambiguity, but assents
to the question having in view the one sense of the words, then, if
the questioner takes it in the other sense, he should say, ‘That
was not what I had in view when I admitted it; I meant the other
sense’: for if a term or expression covers more than one thing, it
is easy to disagree. If, however, the question is both clear and
simple, he should answer either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.
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8
    A premiss in reasoning always either is one of the constituent
elements in the reasoning, or else goes to establish one of these:
(and you can always tell when it is secured in order to establish
something else by the fact of a number of similar questions being
put: for as a rule people secure their universal by means either of
induction or of likeness):-accordingly the particular propositions
should all be admitted, if they are true and generally held. On the
other hand, against the universal one should try to bring some
negative instance; for to bring the argument to a standstill
without a negative instance, either real or apparent, shows
ill-temper. If, then, a man refuses to grant the universal when
supported by many instances, although he has no negative instance
to show, he obviously shows ill-temper. If, moreover, he cannot
even attempt a counter-proof that it is not true, far more likely
is he to be thought ill-tempered-although even counter-proof is not
enough: for we often hear arguments that are contrary to common
opinions, whose solution is yet difficult, e.g. the argument of
Zeno that it is impossible to move or to traverse the stadium;-but
still, this is no reason for omitting to assert the opposites of
these views. If, then, a man refuses to admit the proposition
without having either a negative instance or some counter-argument
to bring against it, clearly he is ill-tempered: for ill-temper in
argument consists in answering in ways other than the above, so as
to wreck the reasoning.
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9
    Before maintaining either a thesis or a definition the answerer
should try his hand at attacking it by himself; for clearly his
business is to oppose those positions from which questioners
demolish what he has laid down.
    He should beware of maintaining a hypothesis that is generally
rejected: and this it may be in two ways: for it may be one which
results in absurd statements, e.g. suppose any one were to say that
everything is in motion or that nothing is; and also there are all
those which only a bad character would choose, and which are
implicitly opposed to men’s wishes, e.g. that pleasure is the good,
and that to do injustice is better than to suffer it. For people
then hate him, supposing him to maintain them not for the sake of
argument but because he really thinks them.
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10
    Of all arguments that reason to a false conclusion the right
solution is to demolish the point on which the fallacy that occurs
depends: for the demolition of any random point is no solution,
even though the point demolished be false. For the argument may
contain many falsehoods, e.g. suppose some one to secure the
premisses, ‘He who sits, writes’ and ‘Socrates is sitting’: for
from these it follows that ‘Socrates is writing’. Now we may
demolish the proposition ‘Socrates is sitting’, and still be no
nearer a solution of the argument; it may be true that the point
claimed is false; but it is not on that that fallacy of the
argument depends: for supposing that any one should happen to be
sitting and not writing, it would be impossible in such a case to
apply the same solution. Accordingly, it is not this that needs to
be demolished, but rather that ‘He who sits, writes’: for he who
sits does not always write. He, then, who has demolished the point
on which the fallacy depends, has given the solution of the
argument completely. Any one who knows that it is on such and such
a point that the argument depends, knows the solution of it, just
as in the case of a figure falsely drawn. For it is not enough to
object, even if the point demolished be a falsehood, but the reason
of the fallacy should also be proved: for then it would be clear
whether the man makes his objection with his eyes open or not.
    There are four possible ways of preventing a man from working
his argument to a conclusion. It can be done either by