The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

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ought.
    These states of character, then, are vices; yet they do not
bring disgrace because they are neither harmful to one’s neighbour
nor very unseemly.
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3
    Pride seems even from its name to be concerned with great
things; what sort of great things, is the first question we must
try to answer. It makes no difference whether we consider the state
of character or the man characterized by it. Now the man is thought
to be proud who thinks himself worthy of great things, being worthy
of them; for he who does so beyond his deserts is a fool, but no
virtuous man is foolish or silly. The proud man, then, is the man
we have described. For he who is worthy of little and thinks
himself worthy of little is temperate, but not proud; for pride
implies greatness, as beauty implies a goodsized body, and little
people may be neat and well-proportioned but cannot be beautiful.
On the other hand, he who thinks himself worthy of great things,
being unworthy of them, is vain; though not every one who thinks
himself worthy of more than he really is worthy of in vain. The man
who thinks himself worthy of worthy of less than he is really
worthy of is unduly humble, whether his deserts be great or
moderate, or his deserts be small but his claims yet smaller. And
the man whose deserts are great would seem most unduly humble; for
what would he have done if they had been less? The proud man, then,
is an extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but a mean
in respect of the rightness of them; for he claims what is
accordance with his merits, while the others go to excess or fall
short.
    If, then, he deserves and claims great things, and above all the
great things, he will be concerned with one thing in particular.
Desert is relative to external goods; and the greatest of these, we
should say, is that which we render to the gods, and which people
of position most aim at, and which is the prize appointed for the
noblest deeds; and this is honour; that is surely the greatest of
external goods. Honours and dishonours, therefore, are the objects
with respect to which the proud man is as he should be. And even
apart from argument it is with honour that proud men appear to be
concerned; for it is honour that they chiefly claim, but in
accordance with their deserts. The unduly humble man falls short
both in comparison with his own merits and in comparison with the
proud man’s claims. The vain man goes to excess in comparison with
his own merits, but does not exceed the proud man’s claims.
    Now the proud man, since he deserves most, must be good in the
highest degree; for the better man always deserves more, and the
best man most. Therefore the truly proud man must be good. And
greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a
proud man. And it would be most unbecoming for a proud man to fly
from danger, swinging his arms by his sides, or to wrong another;
for to what end should he do disgraceful acts, he to whom nothing
is great? If we consider him point by point we shall see the utter
absurdity of a proud man who is not good. Nor, again, would he be
worthy of honour if he were bad; for honour is the prize of virtue,
and it is to the good that it is rendered. Pride, then, seems to be
a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it
is not found without them. Therefore it is hard to be truly proud;
for it is impossible without nobility and goodness of character. It
is chiefly with honours and dishonours, then, that the proud man is
concerned; and at honours that are great and conferred by good men
he will be moderately Pleased, thinking that he is coming by his
own or even less than his own; for there can be no honour that is
worthy of perfect virtue, yet he will at any rate accept it since
they have nothing greater to bestow on him; but honour from casual
people and on trifling grounds he will utterly despise, since it is
not this that he deserves, and dishonour too, since in his case it
cannot be just. In the first place, then, as has been said, the
proud man is concerned with honours; yet he will also bear himself
with moderation towards wealth and power and all good or evil
fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither over-joyed by
good fortune nor over-pained by evil. For not even towards honour
does he bear himself as if it were a very great thing. Power and
wealth are desirable for the sake of honour (at least those who
have them wish to get honour by means