The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

step is thought proper to the proud man, a deep
voice, and a level utterance; for the man who takes few things
seriously is not likely to be hurried, nor the man who thinks
nothing great to be excited, while a shrill voice and a rapid gait
are the results of hurry and excitement.
    Such, then, is the proud man; the man who falls short of him is
unduly humble, and the man who goes beyond him is vain. Now even
these are not thought to be bad (for they are not malicious), but
only mistaken. For the unduly humble man, being worthy of good
things, robs himself of what he deserves, and to have something bad
about him from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of
good things, and seems also not to know himself; else he would have
desired the things he was worthy of, since these were good. Yet
such people are not thought to be fools, but rather unduly
retiring. Such a reputation, however, seems actually to make them
worse; for each class of people aims at what corresponds to its
worth, and these people stand back even from noble actions and
undertakings, deeming themselves unworthy, and from external goods
no less. Vain people, on the other hand, are fools and ignorant of
themselves, and that manifestly; for, not being worthy of them,
they attempt honourable undertakings, and then are found out; and
tetadorn themselves with clothing and outward show and such things,
and wish their strokes of good fortune to be made public, and speak
about them as if they would be honoured for them. But undue
humility is more opposed to pride than vanity is; for it is both
commoner and worse.
    Pride, then, is concerned with honour on the grand scale, as has
been said.
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4
    There seems to be in the sphere of honour also, as was said in
our first remarks on the subject, a virtue which would appear to be
related to pride as liberality is to magnificence. For neither of
these has anything to do with the grand scale, but both dispose us
as is right with regard to middling and unimportant objects; as in
getting and giving of wealth there is a mean and an excess and
defect, so too honour may be desired more than is right, or less,
or from the right sources and in the right way. We blame both the
ambitious man as am at honour more than is right and from wrong
sources, and the unambitious man as not willing to be honoured even
for noble reasons. But sometimes we praise the ambitious man as
being manly and a lover of what is noble, and the unambitious man
as being moderate and self-controlled, as we said in our first
treatment of the subject. Evidently, since ‘fond of such and such
an object’ has more than one meaning, we do not assign the term
‘ambition’ or ‘love of honour’ always to the same thing, but when
we praise the quality we think of the man who loves honour more
than most people, and when we blame it we think of him who loves it
more than is right. The mean being without a name, the extremes
seem to dispute for its place as though that were vacant by
default. But where there is excess and defect, there is also an
intermediate; now men desire honour both more than they should and
less; therefore it is possible also to do so as one should; at all
events this is the state of character that is praised, being an
unnamed mean in respect of honour. Relatively to ambition it seems
to be unambitiousness, and relatively to unambitiousness it seems
to be ambition, while relatively to both severally it seems in a
sense to be both together. This appears to be true of the other
virtues also. But in this case the extremes seem to be
contradictories because the mean has not received a name.
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5
    Good temper is a mean with respect to anger; the middle state
being unnamed, and the extremes almost without a name as well, we
place good temper in the middle position, though it inclines
towards the deficiency, which is without a name. The excess might
called a sort of ‘irascibility’. For the passion is anger, while
its causes are many and diverse.
    The man who is angry at the right things and with the right
people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he
ought, is praised. This will be the good-tempered man, then, since
good temper is praised. For the good-tempered man tends to be
unperturbed and not to be led by passion, but to be angry in the
manner, at the things, and for the length of time, that the rule
dictates; but he is thought to err rather in the