The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we
perceive, and if we think, that we think; and if to perceive that
we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (for existence
was defined as perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that one
lives is in itself one of the things that are pleasant (for life is
by nature good, and to perceive what is good present in oneself is
pleasant); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for good
men, because to them existence is good and pleasant for they are
pleased at the consciousness of the presence in them of what is in
itself good); and if as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to
his friend also (for his friend is another self):-if all this be
true, as his own being is desirable for each man, so, or almost so,
is that of his friend. Now his being was seen to be desirable
because he perceived his own goodness, and such perception is
pleasant in itself. He needs, therefore, to be conscious of the
existence of his friend as well, and this will be realized in their
living together and sharing in discussion and thought; for this is
what living together would seem to mean in the case of man, and
not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place.
    If, then, being is in itself desirable for the supremely happy
man (since it is by its nature good and pleasant), and that of his
friend is very much the same, a friend will be one of the things
that are desirable. Now that which is desirable for him he must
have, or he will be deficient in this respect. The man who is to be
happy will therefore need virtuous friends.
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10
    Should we, then, make as many friends as possible, or-as in the
case of hospitality it is thought to be suitable advice, that one
should be ‘neither a man of many guests nor a man with none’-will
that apply to friendship as well; should a man neither be
friendless nor have an excessive number of friends?
    To friends made with a view to utility this saying would seem
thoroughly applicable; for to do services to many people in return
is a laborious task and life is not long enough for its
performance. Therefore friends in excess of those who are
sufficient for our own life are superfluous, and hindrances to the
noble life; so that we have no need of them. Of friends made with a
view to pleasure, also, few are enough, as a little seasoning in
food is enough.
    But as regards good friends, should we have as many as possible,
or is there a limit to the number of one’s friends, as there is to
the size of a city? You cannot make a city of ten men, and if there
are a hundred thousand it is a city no longer. But the proper
number is presumably not a single number, but anything that falls
between certain fixed points. So for friends too there is a fixed
number perhaps the largest number with whom one can live together
(for that, we found, thought to be very characteristic of
friendship); and that one cannot live with many people and divide
oneself up among them is plain. Further, they too must be friends
of one another, if they are all to spend their days together; and
it is a hard business for this condition to be fulfilled with a
large number. It is found difficult, too, to rejoice and to grieve
in an intimate way with many people, for it may likely happen that
one has at once to be happy with one friend and to mourn with
another. Presumably, then, it is well not to seek to have as many
friends as possible, but as many as are enough for the purpose of
living together; for it would seem actually impossible to be a
great friend to many people. This is why one cannot love several
people; love is ideally a sort of excess of friendship, and that
can only be felt towards one person; therefore great friendship too
can only be felt towards a few people. This seems to be confirmed
in practice; for we do not find many people who are friends in the
comradely way of friendship, and the famous friendships of this
sort are always between two people. Those who have many friends and
mix intimately with them all are thought to be no one’s friend,
except in the way proper to fellow-citizens, and such people are
also called obsequious. In the way proper to fellow-citizens,
indeed, it is possible to be the friend of many and yet not be
obsequious but a genuinely good man; but one cannot have with many
people the friendship based on virtue and on the character of our
friends themselves, and we must be content if we find even a