The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

thought the greatest of external goods. And if it
is more characteristic of a friend to do well by another than to be
well done by, and to confer benefits is characteristic of the good
man and of virtue, and it is nobler to do well by friends than by
strangers, the good man will need people to do well by. This is why
the question is asked whether we need friends more in prosperity or
in adversity, on the assumption that not only does a man in
adversity need people to confer benefits on him, but also those who
are prospering need people to do well by. Surely it is strange,
too, to make the supremely happy man a solitary; for no one would
choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a
political creature and one whose nature is to live with others.
Therefore even the happy man lives with others; for he has the
things that are by nature good. And plainly it is better to spend
his days with friends and good men than with strangers or any
chance persons. Therefore the happy man needs friends.
    What then is it that the first school means, and in what respect
is it right? Is it that most identify friends with useful people?
Of such friends indeed the supremely happy man will have no need,
since he already has the things that are good; nor will he need
those whom one makes one’s friends because of their pleasantness,
or he will need them only to a small extent (for his life, being
pleasant, has no need of adventitious pleasure); and because he
does not need such friends he is thought not to need friends.
    But that is surely not true. For we have said at the outset that
happiness is an activity; and activity plainly comes into being and
is not present at the start like a piece of property. If (1)
happiness lies in living and being active, and the good man’s
activity is virtuous and pleasant in itself, as we have said at the
outset, and (2) a thing’s being one’s own is one of the attributes
that make it pleasant, and (3) we can contemplate our neighbours
better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, and if
the actions of virtuous men who are their friends are pleasant to
good men (since these have both the attributes that are naturally
pleasant),-if this be so, the supremely happy man will need friends
of this sort, since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actions
and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is
his friend have both these qualities.
    Further, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasantly.
Now if he were a solitary, life would be hard for him; for by
oneself it is not easy to be continuously active; but with others
and towards others it is easier. With others therefore his activity
will be more continuous, and it is in itself pleasant, as it ought
to be for the man who is supremely happy; for a good man qua good
delights in virtuous actions and is vexed at vicious ones, as a
musical man enjoys beautiful tunes but is pained at bad ones. A
certain training in virtue arises also from the company of the
good, as Theognis has said before us.
    If we look deeper into the nature of things, a virtuous friend
seems to be naturally desirable for a virtuous man. For that which
is good by nature, we have said, is for the virtuous man good and
pleasant in itself. Now life is defined in the case of animals by
the power of perception in that of man by the power of perception
or thought; and a power is defined by reference to the
corresponding activity, which is the essential thing; therefore
life seems to be essentially the act of perceiving or thinking. And
life is among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves,
since it is determinate and the determinate is of the nature of the
good; and that which is good by nature is also good for the
virtuous man (which is the reason why life seems pleasant to all
men); but we must not apply this to a wicked and corrupt life nor
to a life spent in pain; for such a life is indeterminate, as are
its attributes. The nature of pain will become plainer in what
follows. But if life itself is good and pleasant (which it seems to
be, from the very fact that all men desire it, and particularly
those who are good and supremely happy; for to such men life is
most desirable, and their existence is the most supremely happy)
and if he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, that
he hears, and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case of all
other activities similarly there is something which perceives that
we