The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

and
established democracies. Since cities have increased in size, no
other form of government appears to be any longer even easy to
establish.
    Even supposing the principle to be maintained that kingly power
is the best thing for states, how about the family of the king? Are
his children to succeed him? If they are no better than anybody
else, that will be mischievous. But, says the lover of royalty, the
king, though he might, will not hand on his power to his children.
That, however, is hardly to be expected, and is too much to ask of
human nature. There is also a difficulty about the force which he
is to employ; should a king have guards about him by whose aid he
may be able to coerce the refractory? If not, how will he
administer his kingdom? Even if he be the lawful sovereign who does
nothing arbitrarily or contrary to law, still he must have some
force wherewith to maintain the law. In the case of a limited
monarchy there is not much difficulty in answering this question;
the king must have such force as will be more than a match for one
or more individuals, but not so great as that of the people. The
ancients observe this principle when they have guards to any one
whom they appointed dictator or tyrant. Thus, when Dionysius asked
the Syracusans to allow him guards, somebody advised that they
should give him only such a number.
XVI
    At this place in the discussion there impends the inquiry
respecting the king who acts solely according to his own will he
has now to be considered. The so-called limited monarchy, or
kingship according to law, as I have already remarked, is not a
distinct form of government, for under all governments, as, for
example, in a democracy or aristocracy, there may be a general
holding office for life, and one person is often made supreme over
the administration of a state. A magistracy of this kind exists at
Epidamnus, and also at Opus, but in the latter city has a more
limited power. Now, absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary rule of a
sovereign over an the citizens, in a city which consists of equals,
is thought by some to be quite contrary to nature; it is argued
that those who are by nature equals must have the same natural
right and worth, and that for unequals to have an equal share, or
for equals to have an uneven share, in the offices of state, is as
bad as for different bodily constitutions to have the same food and
clothing. Wherefore it is thought to be just that among equals
every one be ruled as well as rule, and therefore that an should
have their turn. We thus arrive at law; for an order of succession
implies law. And the rule of the law, it is argued, is preferable
to that of any individual. On the same principle, even if it be
better for certain individuals to govern, they should be made only
guardians and ministers of the law. For magistrates there must
be—this is admitted; but then men say that to give authority to any
one man when all are equal is unjust. Nay, there may indeed be
cases which the law seems unable to determine, but in such cases
can a man? Nay, it will be replied, the law trains officers for
this express purpose, and appoints them to determine matters which
are left undecided by it, to the best of their judgment. Further,
it permits them to make any amendment of the existing laws which
experience suggests. Therefore he who bids the law rule may be
deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule
adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and
passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best
of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire. We are told that a
patient should call in a physician; he will not get better if he is
doctored out of a book. But the parallel of the arts is clearly not
in point; for the physician does nothing contrary to rule from
motives of friendship; he only cures a patient and takes a fee;
whereas magistrates do many things from spite and partiality. And,
indeed, if a man suspected the physician of being in league with
his enemies to destroy him for a bribe, he would rather have
recourse to the book. But certainly physicians, when they are sick,
call in other physicians, and training-masters, when they are in
training, other training-masters, as if they could not judge judge
truly about their own case and might be influenced by their
feelings. Hence it is evident that in seeking for justice men seek
for the mean or neutral, for the law is the mean. Again, customary
laws have more