The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

management of a city, or of
a nation, or of many nations.
XV
    Of these forms we need only consider two, the Lacedaemonian and
the absolute royalty; for most of the others he in a region between
them, having less power than the last, and more than the first.
Thus the inquiry is reduced to two points: first, is it
advantageous to the state that there should be a perpetual general,
and if so, should the office be confined to one family, or open to
the citizens in turn? Secondly, is it well that a single man should
have the supreme power in all things? The first question falls
under the head of laws rather than of constitutions; for perpetual
generalship might equally exist under any form of government, so
that this matter may be dismissed for the present. The other kind
of royalty is a sort of constitution; this we have now to consider,
and briefly to run over the difficulties involved in it. We will
begin by inquiring whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by
the best man or by the best laws.
    The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only in
general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for
any science to abide by written rules is absurd. In Egypt the
physician is allowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day,
but if sooner, he takes the risk. Hence it is clear that a
government acting according to written laws is plainly not the
best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the general
principle which exists in law; and this is a better ruler which is
free from passion than that in which it is innate. Whereas the law
is passionless, passion must ever sway the heart of man. Yes, it
may be replied, but then on the other hand an individual will be
better able to deliberate in particular cases.
    The best man, then, must legislate, and laws must be passed, but
these laws will have no authority when they miss the mark, though
in all other cases retaining their authority. But when the law
cannot determine a point at all, or not well, should the one best
man or should all decide? According to our present practice
assemblies meet, sit in judgment, deliberate, and decide, and their
judgments an relate to individual cases. Now any member of the
assembly, taken separately, is certainly inferior to the wise man.
But the state is made up of many individuals. And as a feast to
which all the guests contribute is better than a banquet furnished
by a single man, so a multitude is a better judge of many things
than any individual.
    Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few; they are
like the greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted
than a little. The individual is liable to be overcome by anger or
by some other passion, and then his judgment is necessarily
perverted; but it is hardly to be supposed that a great number of
persons would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same
moment. Let us assume that they are the freemen, and that they
never act in violation of the law, but fill up the gaps which the
law is obliged to leave. Or, if such virtue is scarcely attainable
by the multitude, we need only suppose that the majority are good
men and good citizens, and ask which will be the more
incorruptible, the one good ruler, or the many who are all good?
Will not the many? But, you will say, there may be parties among
them, whereas the one man is not divided against himself. To which
we may answer that their character is as good as his. If we call
the rule of many men, who are all of them good, aristocracy, and
the rule of one man royalty, then aristocracy will be better for
states than royalty, whether the government is supported by force
or not, provided only that a number of men equal in virtue can be
found.
    The first governments were kingships, probably for this reason,
because of old, when cities were small, men of eminent virtue were
few. Further, they were made kings because they were benefactors,
and benefits can only be bestowed by good men. But when many
persons equal in merit arose, no longer enduring the pre-eminence
of one, they desired to have a commonwealth, and set up a
constitution. The ruling class soon deteriorated and enriched
themselves out of the public treasury; riches became the path to
honor, and so oligarchies naturally grew up. These passed into
tyrannies and tyrannies into democracies; for love of gain in the
ruling classes was always tending to diminish their number, and so
to strengthen the masses, who in the end set upon their masters