The Complete Aristotle (eng.)
the poor are
regarded in an especial sense as parts of a state. Again, because
the rich are generally few in number, while the poor are many, they
appear to be antagonistic, and as the one or the other prevails
they form the government. Hence arises the common opinion that
there are two kinds of government—democracy and oligarchy.
I have already explained that there are many forms of
constitution, and to what causes the variety is due. Let me now
show that there are different forms both of democracy and
oligarchy, as will indeed be evident from what has preceded. For
both in the common people and in the notables various classes are
included; of the common people, one class are husbandmen, another
artisans; another traders, who are employed in buying and selling;
another are the seafaring class, whether engaged in war or in
trade, as ferrymen or as fishermen. (In many places any one of
these classes forms quite a large population; for example,
fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, crews of triremes at Athens,
merchant seamen at Aegina and Chios, ferrymen at Tenedos.) To the
classes already mentioned may be added day-laborers, and those who,
owing to their needy circumstances, have no leisure, or those who
are not of free birth on both sides; and there may be other classes
as well. The notables again may be divided according to their
wealth, birth, virtue, education, and similar differences.
Of forms of democracy first comes that which is said to be based
strictly on equality. In such a democracy the law says that it is
just for the poor to have no more advantage than the rich; and that
neither should be masters, but both equal. For if liberty and
equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in
democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share
in the government to the utmost. And since the people are the
majority, and the opinion of the majority is decisive, such a
government must necessarily be a democracy. Here then is one sort
of democracy. There is another, in which the magistrates are
elected according to a certain property qualification, but a low
one; he who has the required amount of property has a share in the
government, but he who loses his property loses his rights. Another
kind is that in which all the citizens who are under no
disqualification share in the government, but still the law is
supreme. In another, everybody, if he be only a citizen, is
admitted to the government, but the law is supreme as before. A
fifth form of democracy, in other respects the same, is that in
which, not the law, but the multitude, have the supreme power, and
supersede the law by their decrees. This is a state of affairs
brought about by the demagogues. For in democracies which are
subject to the law the best citizens hold the first place, and
there are no demagogues; but where the laws are not supreme, there
demagogues spring up. For the people becomes a monarch, and is many
in one; and the many have the power in their hands, not as
individuals, but collectively. Homer says that ‘it is not good to
have a rule of many,’ but whether he means this corporate rule, or
the rule of many individuals, is uncertain. At all events this sort
of democracy, which is now a monarch, and no longer under the
control of law, seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows into
a despot; the flatterer is held in honor; this sort of democracy
being relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other
forms of monarchy. The spirit of both is the same, and they alike
exercise a despotic rule over the better citizens. The decrees of
the demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant; and the demagogue
is to the one what the flatterer is to the other. Both have great
power; the flatterer with the tyrant, the demagogue with
democracies of the kind which we are describing. The demagogues
make the decrees of the people override the laws, by referring all
things to the popular assembly. And therefore they grow great,
because the people have an things in their hands, and they hold in
their hands the votes of the people, who are too ready to listen to
them. Further, those who have any complaint to bring against the
magistrates say, ‘Let the people be judges’; the people are too
happy to accept the invitation; and so the authority of every
office is undermined. Such a democracy is fairly open to the
objection that it is not a constitution at all; for where the laws
have no authority, there is no constitution. The law
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