The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

We
also like those with whom we do not feel frightened or
uncomfortable-nobody can like a man of whom he feels frightened.
Friendship has various forms-comradeship, intimacy, kinship, and so
on.
    Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them
unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which
shows that they were done for our own sake and not for some other
reason.
    Enmity and Hatred should clearly be studied by reference to
their opposites. Enmity may be produced by anger or spite or
calumny. Now whereas anger arises from offences against oneself,
enmity may arise even without that; we may hate people merely
because of what we take to be their character. Anger is always
concerned with individuals-a Callias or a Socrates-whereas hatred
is directed also against classes: we all hate any thief and any
informer. Moreover, anger can be cured by time; but hatred cannot.
The one aims at giving pain to its object, the other at doing him
harm; the angry man wants his victims to feel; the hater does not
mind whether they feel or not. All painful things are felt; but the
greatest evils, injustice and folly, are the least felt, since
their presence causes no pain. And anger is accompanied by pain,
hatred is not; the angry man feels pain, but the hater does not.
Much may happen to make the angry man pity those who offend him,
but the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he
has once hated: for the one would have the offenders suffer for
what they have done; the other would have them cease to exist.
    It is plain from all this that we can prove people to be friends
or enemies; if they are not, we can make them out to be so; if they
claim to be so, we can refute their claim; and if it is disputed
whether an action was due to anger or to hatred, we can attribute
it to whichever of these we prefer.
5
    To turn next to Fear, what follows will show things and persons
of which, and the states of mind in which, we feel afraid. Fear may
be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some
destructive or painful evil in the future. Of destructive or
painful evils only; for there are some evils, e.g. wickedness or
stupidity, the prospect of which does not frighten us: I mean only
such as amount to great pains or losses. And even these only if
they appear not remote but so near as to be imminent: we do not
fear things that are a very long way off: for instance, we all know
we shall die, but we are not troubled thereby, because death is not
close at hand. From this definition it will follow that fear is
caused by whatever we feel has great power of destroying or of
harming us in ways that tend to cause us great pain. Hence the very
indications of such things are terrible, making us feel that the
terrible thing itself is close at hand; the approach of what is
terrible is just what we mean by ‘danger’. Such indications are the
enmity and anger of people who have power to do something to us;
for it is plain that they have the will to do it, and so they are
on the point of doing it. Also injustice in possession of power;
for it is the unjust man’s will to do evil that makes him unjust.
Also outraged virtue in possession of power; for it is plain that,
when outraged, it always has the will to retaliate, and now it has
the power to do so. Also fear felt by those who have the power to
do something to us, since such persons are sure to be ready to do
it. And since most men tend to be bad-slaves to greed, and cowards
in danger-it is, as a rule, a terrible thing to be at another man’s
mercy; and therefore, if we have done anything horrible, those in
the secret terrify us with the thought that they may betray or
desert us. And those who can do us wrong are terrible to us when we
are liable to be wronged; for as a rule men do wrong to others
whenever they have the power to do it. And those who have been
wronged, or believe themselves to be wronged, are terrible; for
they are always looking out for their opportunity. Also those who
have done people wrong, if they possess power, since they stand in
fear of retaliation: we have already said that wickedness
possessing power is terrible. Again, our rivals for a thing cause
us fear when we cannot both have it at once; for we are always at
war with such men. We also fear those who are to be feared by
stronger people than ourselves: if they can hurt those stronger
people, still more can they hurt us; and, for the same reason, we
fear those whom