The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

like
ourselves, whose rivals we are. For there are many things that
shame before such people makes us do or leave undone. And we feel
more shame when we are likely to be continually seen by, and go
about under the eyes of, those who know of our disgrace. Hence,
when Antiphon the poet was to be cudgelled to death by order of
Dionysius, and saw those who were to perish with him covering their
faces as they went through the gates, he said, ‘Why do you cover
your faces? Is it lest some of these spectators should see you
to-morrow?’
    So much for Shame; to understand Shamelessness, we need only
consider the converse cases, and plainly we shall have all we
need.
7
    To take Kindness next: the definition of it will show us towards
whom it is felt, why, and in what frames of mind. Kindness-under
the influence of which a man is said to ‘be kind’ may be defined as
helpfulness towards some one in need, not in return for anything,
nor for the advantage of the helper himself, but for that of the
person helped. Kindness is great if shown to one who is in great
need, or who needs what is important and hard to get, or who needs
it at an important and difficult crisis; or if the helper is the
only, the first, or the chief person to give the help. Natural
cravings constitute such needs; and in particular cravings,
accompanied by pain, for what is not being attained. The appetites
are cravings for this kind: sexual desire, for instance, and those
which arise during bodily injuries and in dangers; for appetite is
active both in danger and in pain. Hence those who stand by us in
poverty or in banishment, even if they do not help us much, are yet
really kind to us, because our need is great and the occasion
pressing; for instance, the man who gave the mat in the Lyceum. The
helpfulness must therefore meet, preferably, just this kind of
need; and failing just this kind, some other kind as great or
greater. We now see to whom, why, and under what conditions
kindness is shown; and these facts must form the basis of our
arguments. We must show that the persons helped are, or have been,
in such pain and need as has been described, and that their helpers
gave, or are giving, the kind of help described, in the kind of
need described. We can also see how to eliminate the idea of
kindness and make our opponents appear unkind: we may maintain that
they are being or have been helpful simply to promote their own
interest-this, as has been stated, is not kindness; or that their
action was accidental, or was forced upon them; or that they were
not doing a favour, but merely returning one, whether they know
this or not-in either case the action is a mere return, and is
therefore not a kindness even if the doer does not know how the
case stands. In considering this subject we must look at all the
categories: an act may be an act of kindness because (1) it is a
particular thing, (2) it has a particular magnitude or (3) quality,
or (4) is done at a particular time or (5) place. As evidence of
the want of kindness, we may point out that a smaller service had
been refused to the man in need; or that the same service, or an
equal or greater one, has been given to his enemies; these facts
show that the service in question was not done for the sake of the
person helped. Or we may point out that the thing desired was
worthless and that the helper knew it: no one will admit that he is
in need of what is worthless.
8
    So much for Kindness and Unkindness. Let us now consider Pity,
asking ourselves what things excite pity, and for what persons, and
in what states of our mind pity is felt. Pity may be defined as a
feeling of pain caused by the sight of some evil, destructive or
painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we
might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and
moreover to befall us soon. In order to feel pity, we must
obviously be capable of supposing that some evil may happen to us
or some friend of ours, and moreover some such evil as is stated in
our definition or is more or less of that kind. It is therefore not
felt by those completely ruined, who suppose that no further evil
can befall them, since the worst has befallen them already; nor by
those who imagine themselves immensely fortunate-their feeling is
rather presumptuous insolence, for when they think they possess all
the good things of life, it is clear that the impossibility of evil
befalling them will be included, this being one of the good things
in