The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

as do those who draw
false geometrical figures: for in the multitude of details the
whereabouts of the fallacy is obscured. For this reason also a
questioner sometimes evades observation as he adds in a corner
what, if he formulated it by itself, would not be granted.
    For concealment, then, the rules which should be followed are
the above. Ornament is attained by induction and distinction of
things closely akin. What sort of process induction is obvious: as
for distinction, an instance of the kind of thing meant is the
distinction of one form of knowledge as better than another by
being either more accurate, or concerned with better objects; or
the distinction of sciences into speculative, practical, and
productive. For everything of this kind lends additional ornament
to the argument, though there is no necessity to say them, so far
as the conclusion goes.
    For clearness, examples and comparisons should be adduced, and
let the illustrations be relevant and drawn from things that we
know, as in Homer and not as in Choerilus; for then the proposition
is likely to become clearer.
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2
    In dialectics, syllogism should be employed in reasoning against
dialecticians rather than against the crowd: induction, on the
other hand, is most useful against the crowd. This point has been
treated previously as well.’ In induction, it is possible in some
cases to ask the question in its universal form, but in others this
is not easy, because there is no established general term that
covers all the resemblances: in this case, when people need to
secure the universal, they use the phrase ‘in all cases of this
sort’. But it is one of the very hardest things to distinguish
which of the things adduced are ‘of this sort’, and which are not:
and in this connexion people often throw dust in each others’ eyes
in their discussion, the one party asserting the likeness of things
that are not alike, and the other disputing the likeness of things
that are. One ought, therefore, to try oneself to coin a word to
cover all things of the given sort, so as to leave no opportunity
either to the answerer to dispute, and say that the thing advanced
does not answer to a like description, or to the questioner to
suggest falsely that it does answer to a like description, for many
things appear to answer to like descriptions that do not really do
so.
    If one has made an induction on the strength of several cases
and yet the answerer refuses to grant the universal proposition,
then it is fair to demand his objection. But until one has oneself
stated in what cases it is so, it is not fair to demand that he
shall say in what cases it is not so: for one should make the
induction first, and then demand the objection. One ought,
moreover, to claim that the objections should not be brought in
reference to the actual subject of the proposition, unless that
subject happen to be the one and only thing of the kind, as for
instance two is the one prime number among the even numbers: for,
unless he can say that this subject is unique of its kind, the
objector ought to make his objection in regard to some other.
People sometimes object to a universal proposition, and bring their
objection not in regard to the thing itself, but in regard to some
homonym of it: thus they argue that a man can very well have a
colour or a foot or a hand other than his own, for a painter may
have a colour that is not his own, and a cook may have a foot that
is not his own. To meet them, therefore, you should draw the
distinction before putting your question in such cases: for so long
as the ambiguity remains undetected, so long will the objection to
the proposition be deemed valid. If, however, he checks the series
of questions by an objection in regard not to some homonym, but to
the actual thing asserted, the questioner should withdraw the point
objected to, and form the remainder into a universal proposition,
until he secures what he requires; e.g. in the case of
forgetfulness and having forgotten: for people refuse to admit that
the man who has lost his knowledge of a thing has forgotten it,
because if the thing alters, he has lost knowledge of it, but he
has not forgotten it. Accordingly the thing to do is to withdraw
the part objected to, and assert the remainder, e.g. that if a
person have lost knowledge of a thing while it still remains, he
then has forgotten it. One should similarly treat those who object
to the statement that