The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

when
combined, as soon as one’s opponent draws his conclusion one should
take the expression in the contrary way. All such expressions as
the following depend upon the combination or division of the words:
‘Was X being beaten with that with which you saw him being beaten?’
and ‘Did you see him being beaten with that with which he was being
beaten?’ This fallacy has also in it an element of amphiboly in the
questions, but it really depends upon combination. For the meaning
that depends upon the division of the words is not really a double
meaning (for the expression when divided is not the same), unless
also the word that is pronounced, according to its breathing, as
eros and eros is a case of double meaning. (In writing, indeed, a
word is the same whenever it is written of the same letters and in
the same manner—and even there people nowadays put marks at the
side to show the pronunciation—but the spoken words are not the
same.) Accordingly an expression that depends upon division is not
an ambiguous one. It is evident also that not all refutations
depend upon ambiguity as some people say they do.
    The answerer, then, must divide the expression: for
‘I-saw-a-man-being-beaten with my eyes’ is not the same as to say
‘I saw a man being-beaten-with-my-eyes’. Also there is the argument
of Euthydemus proving ‘Then you know now in Sicily that there are
triremes in Piraeus’: and again, ‘Can a good man who is a cobbler
be bad?’ ‘No.’ ‘But a good man may be a bad cobbler: therefore a
good cobbler will be bad.’ Again, ‘Things the knowledge of which is
good, are good things to learn, aren’t they?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘The
knowledge, however, of evil is good: therefore evil is a good thing
to know.’ ‘Yes. But, you see, evil is both evil and a
thing-to-learn, so that evil is an evil-thing-to-learn, although
the knowledge of evils is good.’ Again, ‘Is it true to say in the
present moment that you are born?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Then you are born in the
present moment.’ ‘No; the expression as divided has a different
meaning: for it is true to say-in-the-present-moment that “you are
born”, but not “You are born-in-the-present-moment”.’ Again, ‘Could
you do what you can, and as you can?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But when not harping,
you have the power to harp: and therefore you could harp when not
harping.’ ‘No: he has not the power to harp-while-not-harping;
merely, when he is not doing it, he has the power to do it.’ Some
people solve this last refutation in another way as well. For, they
say, if he has granted that he can do anything in the way he can,
still it does not follow that he can harp when not harping: for it
has not been granted that he will do anything in every way in which
he can; and it is not the same thing’ to do a thing in the way he
can’ and ‘to do it in every way in which he can’. But evidently
they do not solve it properly: for of arguments that depend upon
the same point the solution is the same, whereas this will not fit
all cases of the kind nor yet all ways of putting the questions: it
is valid against the questioner, but not against his argument.
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21
    Accentuation gives rise to no fallacious arguments, either as
written or as spoken, except perhaps some few that might be made
up; e.g. the following argument. ‘Is ou katalueis a house?’ ‘Yes.’
‘Is then ou katalueis the negation of katalueis?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But you
said that ou katalueis is a house: therefore the house is a
negation.’ How one should solve this, is clear: for the word does
not mean the same when spoken with an acuter and when spoken with a
graver accent.
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22
    It is clear also how one must meet those fallacies that depend
on the identical expressions of things that are not identical,
seeing that we are in possession of the kinds of predications. For
the one man, say, has granted, when asked, that a term denoting a
substance does not belong as an attribute, while the other has
shown that some attribute belongs which is in the Category of
Relation or of Quantity, but is usually thought to denote a
substance because of its expression; e.g. in the following
argument: ‘Is it possible to be doing and to have done the same
thing at the same time?’ ‘No.’ ‘But, you see, it is surely possible
to be seeing and to have seen the same thing at the same time, and
in the same