The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

accident of the thing, and since in some cases it is
generally agreed and people admit that it belongs, while in others
they deny that it need belong, we should therefore, as soon as the
conclusion has been drawn, say in answer to them all alike, that
there is no need for such an attribute to belong. One must,
however, be prepared to adduce an example of the kind of attribute
meant. All arguments such as the following depend upon Accident.
‘Do you know what I am going to ask you? you know the man who is
approaching’, or ‘the man in the mask’? ‘Is the statue your work of
art?’ or ‘Is the dog your father?’ ‘Is the product of a small
number with a small number a small number?’ For it is evident in
all these cases that there is no necessity for the attribute which
is true of the thing’s accident to be true of the thing as well.
For only to things that are indistinguishable and one in essence is
it generally agreed that all the same attributes belong; whereas in
the case of a good thing, to be good is not the same as to be going
to be the subject of a question; nor in the case of a man
approaching, or wearing a mask, is ‘to be approaching’ the same
thing as ‘to be Coriscus’, so that suppose I know Coriscus, but do
not know the man who is approaching, it still isn’t the case that I
both know and do not know the same man; nor, again, if this is mine
and is also a work of art, is it therefore my work of art, but my
property or thing or something else. (The solution is after the
same manner in the other cases as well.)
    Some solve these refutations by demolishing the original
proposition asked: for they say that it is possible to know and not
to know the same thing, only not in the same respect: accordingly,
when they don’t know the man who is coming towards them, but do
know Corsicus, they assert that they do know and don’t know the
same object, but not in the same respect. Yet, as we have already
remarked, the correction of arguments that depend upon the same
point ought to be the same, whereas this one will not stand if one
adopts the same principle in regard not to knowing something, but
to being, or to being is a in a certain state, e.g. suppose that X
is father, and is also yours: for if in some cases this is true and
it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, yet with
that case the solution stated has nothing to do. Certainly there is
nothing to prevent the same argument from having a number of flaws;
but it is not the exposition of any and every fault that
constitutes a solution: for it is possible for a man to show that a
false conclusion has been proved, but not to show on what it
depends, e.g. in the case of Zeno’s argument to prove that motion
is impossible. So that even if any one were to try to establish
that this doctrine is an impossible one, he still is mistaken, and
even if he proved his case ten thousand times over, still this is
no solution of Zeno’s argument: for the solution was all along an
exposition of false reasoning, showing on what its falsity depends.
If then he has not proved his case, or is trying to establish even
a true proposition, or a false one, in a false manner, to point
this out is a true solution. Possibly, indeed, the present
suggestion may very well apply in some cases: but in these cases,
at any rate, not even this would be generally agreed: for he knows
both that Coriscus is Coriscus and that the approaching figure is
approaching. To know and not to know the same thing is generally
thought to be possible, when e.g. one knows that X is white, but
does not realize that he is musical: for in that way he does know
and not know the same thing, though not in the same respect. But as
to the approaching figure and Coriscus he knows both that it is
approaching and that he is Coriscus.
    A like mistake to that of those whom we have mentioned is that
of those who solve the proof that every number is a small number:
for if, when the conclusion is not proved, they pass this over and
say that a conclusion has been proved and is true, on the ground
that every number is both great and small, they make a mistake.
    Some people also use the principle of ambiguity to solve the
aforesaid reasonings, e.g. the proof that ‘X is your father’, or
‘son’, or ‘slave’. Yet it is evident that if the appearance a proof
depends upon a plurality of meanings, the term, or the expression
in question, ought to bear a number of literal senses, whereas no
one