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The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

Titel: The Complete Aristotle (eng.) Kostenlos Bücher Online Lesen
Autoren: Aristotle
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expression without any
qualification, the sophist’s conclusion follows. If, on the other
hand, the conclusion does not follow, then that could not be the
true solution: and what we say in regard to the foregoing examples
is that, even if all the sophist’s premisses be granted, still no
proof is effected.
    Moreover, the following too belong to this group of arguments.
‘If something be in writing did some one write it?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But it
is now in writing that you are seated-a false statement, though it
was true at the time when it was written: therefore the statement
that was written is at the same time false and true.’ But this is
fallacious, for the falsity or truth of a statement or opinion
indicates not a substance but a quality: for the same account
applies to the case of an opinion as well. Again, ‘Is what a
learner learns what he learns?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But suppose some one learns
“slow” quick’. Then his (the sophist’s) words denote not what the
learner learns but how he learns it. Also, ‘Does a man tread upon
what he walks through? ‘Yes.’ ‘But X walks through a whole day.’
No, rather the words denote not what he walks through, but when he
walks; just as when any one uses the words ‘to drink the cup’ he
denotes not what he drinks, but the vessel out of which he drinks.
Also, ‘Is it either by learning or by discovery that a man knows
what he knows?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But suppose that of a pair of things he has
discovered one and learned the other, the pair is not known to him
by either method.’ No: ‘what’ he knows, means’ every single thing’
he knows, individually; but this does not mean ‘all the things’ he
knows, collectively. Again, there is the proof that there is a
‘third man’ distinct from Man and from individual men. But that is
a fallacy, for ‘Man’, and indeed every general predicate, denotes
not an individual substance, but a particular quality, or the being
related to something in a particular manner, or something of that
sort. Likewise also in the case of ‘Coriscus’ and ‘Coriscus the
musician’ there is the problem, Are they the same or different?’
For the one denotes an individual substance and the other a
quality, so that it cannot be isolated; though it is not the
isolation which creates the ‘third man’, but the admission that it
is an individual substance. For ‘Man’ cannot be an individual
substance, as Callias is. Nor is the case improved one whit even if
one were to call the clement he has isolated not an individual
substance but a quality: for there will still be the one beside the
many, just as ‘Man’ was. It is evident then that one must not grant
that what is a common predicate applying to a class universally is
an individual substance, but must say that denotes either a
quality, or a relation, or a quantity, or something of that
kind.
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23
    It is a general rule in dealing with arguments that depend on
language that the solution always follows the opposite of the point
on which the argument turns: e.g. if the argument depends upon
combination, then the solution consists in division; if upon
division, then in combination. Again, if it depends on an acute
accent, the solution is a grave accent; if on a grave accent, it is
an acute. If it depends on ambiguity, one can solve it by using the
opposite term; e.g. if you find yourself calling something
inanimate, despite your previous denial that it was so, show in
what sense it is alive: if, on the other hand, one has declared it
to be inanimate and the sophist has proved it to be animate, say
how it is inanimate. Likewise also in a case of amphiboly. If the
argument depends on likeness of expression, the opposite will be
the solution. ‘Could a man give what he has not got? ‘No, not what
he has not got; but he could give it in a way in which he has not
got it, e.g. one die by itself.’ Does a man know either by learning
or by discovery each thing that he knows, singly? but not the
things that he knows, collectively.’ Also a man treads, perhaps, on
any thing he walks through, but not on the time he walks through.
Likewise also in the case of the other examples.
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    div id="section24" class="section" title="24">
24
    In dealing with arguments that depend on Accident, one and the
same solution meets all cases. For since it is indeterminate when
an attribute should be ascribed to a thing, in cases where it
belongs to the

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